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Abstract
The humanitarian field is being governed at a global level, but not by states. I 
investigate the implications of anarchy in the transnational governance of 
humanitarianism- as distinct from the interstate anarchy described in mainstream IR. 
The qualitative difference in the implications of anarchy necessitate an adaptation of 
familiar IR concepts. Diverging interests in the field of humanitarianism are mapped 
out- and a model of humanitarian agency produced. As humanitarian organisations 
have diverging interests as to how they desire humanitarian governance to develop- the 
process becomes political- and the question of power relevant. I test the applicability 
of relational power - the facets of power as presented in Social Network Analysis. The 
idea is tested as concept through a comparative analysis of four organisations- and as a 
formal construct against all organisations in the network of memberships- between 
humanitarian governance mechanisms and humanitarian organisations. I end with a 
critical re-examination of of both the concept and the construct- and their applicability 
to humanitarian governance in particular- and transnational governance in general. 
Word Count: 33155
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2 Introduction
Governance, by definition, implies power. As bread presupposes a baker; existence of 
the governed presupposes at least one governor.  This is by no means an original 
thought in International Relations (IR), where the focus of the academic research is on 
how this can be accomplished under the conditions of anarchy and sovereignty. In 
recent years it has become more common to broaden the areas where this question is 
asked. While IR-scholars traditionally studied the power relations between states, an 
emerging new field has focused more on non-state actors, or transnational actors 
(TNAs). This literature has primarily focused on proving “to a states-centered picture 
of world politics that TNAs matter” (Risse 2007: 268). In this thesis I have no 
intention of engaging in this debate directly. Whether or not TNAs can impact world 
politics- against the interest of powerful states- is not directly relevant to my claim. 
What I propose is that there are areas of world politics where states are inactive. To be 
more precise, governance of actors from many different states is occurring- without 
state actors driving or controlling the process. I contend that the rapidly expanding 
governance structure for the humanitarian field is one such instance. 
Handbooks are being written (Collaborative for Development Action 2004), universal 
operational standards are being set (The Sphere Project 2011), and treatise establishing 
common platforms are being signed (Global Humanitarian Platform 2007). While 
these rules, standards and treatise remain non-enforceable, much like the proliferating 
“soft law” among states (see Raustiala and Slaughter 2007: 551),  there are indications 
that they have some influence over the actors they are intended to bind (see Gostelow 
1999; Buchanan-Smith 2003; Stoddard 2003; McNamara 2006). Humanitarianism is 
being governed, but not by states or international organisations. It is being governed 
by the humanitarian organisations themselves. Intergovernmental, non-governmental, 
secular, and religious organisations, engaged in humanitarian action, are providing 
common governance mechanisms for themselves.
As I shall demonstrate, governance is emerging through a series of initiatives, 
intertwined in a complex web of connections and affiliations. Power, in this context, is 
Humanitarian Governance: Network, Agency and Power
Introduction 2
not given a priori. Conceptions of power, as defined by military force, security 
dilemmas, or absolute gains in the neo-realist and neo-liberalist schools of IR, loose 
their relevance. Humanitarian organisations have no armies with which they can wage 
war upon each other, nor do their financial assets bear direct relevance upon how they 
interact. They do not trade. While this field is being governed outside the jurisdiction 
of a singular sovereign entity, it is not happening within the context of the interstate 
anarchy. Humanitarian organisations are not sovereign. The only clear characteristic 
which is shared by the interstate and inter-humanitarian politics, is divergent interests. 
None the less, a form of transnational governance is emerging.
From an IR perspective this development begs an answer to the question of power. 
How can we conceive of power in a context that is neither anarchic- nor under a single 
jurisdiction? What is power when actors are cannot induce threats- or buy each other 
off? (see Hovi 1998) What is the structure in which humanitarian organisations 
interact, if it is not comparable to the interstate anarchy, the market or a hierarchy? In 
order to explore this theme, I ask the question:
What actors have power and influence over the political processes aimed at  
producing humanitarian governance?
2.1 Humanitarianism and Humanitarian Organisations
Humanitarianism, in the literature on the subject, is most often defined as “the desire 
to relieve the suffering of a distant stranger” (Weiss 1999; Barnett 2005; Kennedy 
2009). The distance to the sufferer, in the context of this thesis, is taken to mean that 
the aid is provided to beneficiaries in another country. Suffering is taken to mean 
something more immediate in nature than poverty or oppression. Humanitarian action 
is the response to an immediate emergency, conflict or catastrophe. As such it 
constitutes a field separate from development and poverty reduction. This is at least 
the platonic ideal form of humanitarianism. In reality the boundaries between these 
fields of action have become more blurred (c.f. Barnett 2009). 
Today, humanitarianism has become a global enterprise. The last twenty years have 
seen an explosive growth in the sector, both in the number of operational agencies- 
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and in the available funding (Barnett and Weiss 2011: 26-32). While the numbers 
remain uncertain estimates, it is possible to provide some indication of the extent of 
this growth:  a census of American humanitarian organisations involved in emergency 
relief shows that there where 62 in 1950, 267 in 1990, and a staggering figure of 436 
in 2000.  On the global level, recent estimates state that there are some 2500 
humanitarian organisations in the world, whereof 260 can be characterised as major 
players. The number of humanitarian actors on the ground for any given emergency 
can be immense: during the bombing of Sarajevo in 1994 there were more than 200 
international humanitarian agencies present on the ground. (Barnet and Weiss 2008: 
31) 
This large fauna of operative humanitarian agencies includes all manner of 
organisations. There are intergovernmental organisations, such as the UNHCR, 
UNICEF, and the WFP; religious organisations, like World Vision, Islamic Relief and 
Caritas Internationalis; non-governmental multinationals as Oxfam, Save the Children 
and Care; organisations with special status in international law, solely the ICRC. As 
shall be extensively discussed later, they differ along a series attributes, yet share a 
commitment to relieving distant suffering. More recently they have also started to 
share a concern that lack of coordination between themselves is leading to sub-optimal 
outcomes (Barnett and Weiss 2011).
2.2 Humanitarian Governance
Humanitarian governance as a broad phenomenon has, to my knowledge, not been 
systematically investigated before within- at least not in an IR context. By 
humanitarian governance I mean any attempt at regulating the field as a whole. 
Attempts to regulate within a specific national contexts are not included. Humanitarian 
governance is in this thesis the transnational governance of the humanitarian field. 
Which also implies transorganisational governance; governance of more than one 
organisational entity. Specifically, it is manifested in governance mechanisms- by 
which I mean any instrument, organisation or agreement- seeking to regulate any 
aspect of the humanitarian field. 
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Several of the challenges facing the humanitarian sector can be described as problems 
of collective action1,  these challenges can present themselves in policies ranging from 
human resources to standards of relief delivery. The need for humanitarian governance 
occurs because individual solutions in these areas can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
Humanitarian organisations, and the sector as a whole, could potentially benefit 
greatly from increased governance. However, this process becomes political as the 
organisations differ with regards to what form and content they desire with regards to 
which policy areas. The field is too heterogeneous to simplify in terms of one set of 
preferences and interests. I will also use the term governance initiative, as distinct from 
governance mechanisms. An initiative is an individual element of governance. So that 
the Sphere-project (see Sphere 2012) is the governing mechanism that produced the 
Sphere Handbook (see The Sphere Project 2011) as a governance initiative.
2.3 The inter-humanitarian anarchy
Humanitarian organisations are not sovereign. They work under the framework of the 
nation states- and are liable under the law and sovereign jurisdiction of the states in 
which they operate. However, their work is by definition conducted under special 
circumstances. Emergency relief becomes necessary as states are unable -or unwilling- 
to provide adequate relief for their population. This means that the work is conducted 
in an environment were the state is already hard pressed to effectively implement its 
sovereign will. While the state might wish to control and coordinate the activities of 
humanitarian organisations, its capacity to do so is often severely compromised. This 
is most evident in the case of war, when the ability to exert sovereignty dwindles 
alongside the monopoly on violence. However, it can also be the case in natural 
disasters. The sudden onset of a natural disaster leaves local authorities hard pressed- 
and they seldom have the additional capacity and bureaucratic resources available to 
control an influx of humanitarian agencies. While these might seem as theoretical 
musings, they manifests as a reoccurring reality (see eg. DeWaal 1997; Smilie 2001; 
Juma and Suhrke 2002). 
So in the operational context, while not sovereign, humanitarian agencies are often 
1 See Chapter 2. Theory and Earlier Research
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ungovernable. Attacking the issue from a different angle, the organisations could 
potentially be controlled by the state of origin- that is the state in which they have their 
head office. However, the origin state has no sovereignty over the territories in which 
the organisations operate. While they can demand certain standards if they relate to the 
organisation as donors, they cannot effectively control the organisations operation. 
Humanitarian organisations are transnational, and therefore outside the effective 
sovereignty of any single state.
It is not unfair to summarise this situation as a form of anarchy. As Keohane and 
Axelrod (1985: 226) put it, anarchy simply implies the “lack of common government 
in World Politics”. This is as true for sovereign states, as it is for humanitarian 
organisations. None the less, there are some qualitative differences between the inter-
humanitarian and the interstate anarchy. Much of IR is built on deriving causal 
necessities from the international anarchy. The anarchy as a structure has therefore 
been the subject of much debate, centring primarily around the importance of absolute 
and relative gains (see eg. Grieco 1988; Powell 1991; Snidal 1991). In the case of 
humanitarian organisations, this theoretical distinction becomes somewhat empty. As 
neither trade, nor war is a viable option, the structural implications of the anarchy are 
not transferable. Neither the Hobbesian state of nature (see Hobbes 1985), nor the 
liberal market anarchy (deMolinari 1977) are apt descriptions of the context in which 
humanitarian organisations seek to govern themselves. Deprived of the threat of 
violence and the spectre of commerce, the anarchy is perhaps best described by one of 
its' ideological proponents:
Anarchy is "the name given to a principle or theory of life and conduct under which  
society is conceived without government- harmony in such a society being obtained,  
not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements  
[...]  Voluntary associations would represent an interwoven network, composed of  
an infinite variety of groups and federations of all sizes and degrees, local,  
regional, national and international temporary or more or less permanent - for all  
possible purposes." (Kropotkin 1910)
Kropotkin's description of anarchy has similarities with the observed phenomena of 
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humanitarian governance. Yet Kropotkin clearly envisaged this as a state of affairs 
where dominance, if not power, would be absent. The challenge addressed in this 
thesis is how to conceive of power- within this structure of anarchy.
2.4 IR-Theoretical context
Academic IR has traditionally been defined as the study of politics between states. As 
Keohane and Nye (1971: 329)  succinctly summarised it: "The state, regarded as an 
actor of purpose and power, is the primary unit of action; its' main agents are the 
diplomat and soldier." In this regard,  this thesis deals with issues at the periphery of 
the IR academic discipline. States, if they do play a part, have a very limited influence 
over global humanitarian governance. This would seem to place the thesis within the 
domain of the growing field of TNA research. The red thread throughout  TNA 
research is its' focus on TNAs impact on the politics between states. Influence, or TNA 
power, is implicitly defined as the ability to alter the actions of states or  
intergovernmental organisations. This presupposition excludes the possibility that 
TNAs can be of significance to world politics in their own right. Not surprisingly, 
realists tended to claim that TNA impact was limited to influence over non-essential 
foreign policy areas for a state. That is, their influence on world politics is via 
powerful states. Liberal institutionalist, on the other hand, have focused on TNAs 
ability to influence the policy of intergovernmental organisations. More recently, 
complex models of how -and under what conditions- TNAs matter, have been 
presented. There have been a series of attempts to specify the conditions for impact 
and variables determining degree of impact for non-state actors. (see Risse 2007: 267) 
My argument is that not all political processes on a global level include states, 
humanitarian governance being a case in point. This claim is not to be taken to mean 
that humanitarian organisations cannot be influenced by states. Humanitarian 
organisations can be -and are- used  to front state agendas (see e.g. Barnett 2001). 
While states can use humanitarian organisations for different purposes in different 
settings, the global governance of the sector has yet to include states in any meaningful 
capacity2. These process might not be international in the semantic sense, but they are 
2 It should be noted that ALNAP is an exception to this rule. The network is an active collaboration between 
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certainly transnational- and they do matter.  
This claim does fit in with scholars fronting the Gramscian concept of a civil society 
as relevant for IR. For neo-Gramscians the civil society is:
“the political space and collective institutions in which and through which  
individuals form political identities . . . It is the realm of voluntary associations, of  
the norms and practices which make them possible, and of the collective identities  
they form, the realm where “I” becomes “we”.”(Murphy 1994 cited in Germain 
and Kenny 1998: 7)
While the concept of a global civil society is useful- it is not entirely clear that the 
Gramscian approach lends itself to the question of humanitarian governance. First, the 
level of analysis is that of organisations- not individual people. It is the broad fauna of 
humanitarian organisations which construct and -in some cases- adhere to the 
governance mechanisms. Secondly, it is far from clear that humanitarianism has 
evolved into a realm where “I” becomes “we”. Part of the reason for the limited 
success of humanitarian governance is the humanitarian “crise de cohérence” 
(Schloms 2006). There is no unified humanitarian “we” beyond the joint stakes in the 
activity of aiding distant strangers.
Another theoretical candidate for tackling these forms of processes is the analytical 
concept of global governance.  Global governance is defined by Rossenau (1995: 13) 
as the analysis of all “systems of rule at all levels of human activity- from the family to 
the international organization- in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of 
control has transnational repercussions.”  The meta-narrative of the governance 
literature is that the world has grown in complexity- producing an ever increasing 
demand for collaborative action. Problems of collective action are not particular to the 
relations between states, but have become ever more present in all aspects of organised 
human interaction. This increased demand for means of achieving collaborative action 
has produced a massive proliferation of steering mechanisms. The need for 
collaboration is, in other words, presented as a cause for the production of new and 
NGOs, UN agencies, and state-donors. Power relations between the three types of members is a bit unclear 
within the network (see Stein 2009)
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complex forms of governance. (See Rosenau 1995)
This approach is certainly broad enough to include humanitarian governance- but the 
ambitions and scope of the approach might have come at the expense of causal 
complexity. In analysing a specific instance of emerging governance, humanitarian 
governance in this case, Rossenau's approach seems to remove the political component 
from the process. Different actors will, usually, have different preferred outcomes- and 
different available power resources. The structure and content of the eventual 
governance mechanism will necessarily also be a consequence of the  political struggle 
that occurred during the process that established it. I do not dispute the central claims 
made by Rossenau (1995) about the growing complexity of transnational governance, 
but if we are to understand these processes we need to include agency and power in the 
analysis. 
How can the altered structural conditions in transnational governance be used to 
generate a concept of power? Finding no clear answers in the dominant approaches to 
the question, I turn a bit farther afield. Social Network Analysis (SNA) is an area of 
research specifically adapted to analyse complex relations. The theoretical side of the 
method is developed to explain how structural positions in a web of complex 
affiliations can generate advantages for individual actors. The empirical tradition 
provides clear operationalisations of the proposed concepts of structural power. (See 
Tichy, Tushman et al. 1979; Scott 1988; Hanneman and Riddle 2005) Kropotkin might 
have believed that voluntary associations in “an interwoven network, composed of an 
infinite variety of groups and federations” would constitute a form of organisation in 
which uneven distribution of power would cease to be an issue. Social Network 
Analysis is the approach that would beg to differ. 
2.5 Concluding note on relevance 
Theories of an international civil society have proliferated within IR the last twenty 
years, most notably within the study of TNAs and global governance. This thesis seeks 
to expand upon these approaches by taking the next logical step towards inclusion of 
non-states actors in IR: regarding non-state actors as political agents by their own 
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right- independent of states. Analysing humanitarian governance is of special interest, 
because it is a case of similar non-state agents, attempting to overcome problems 
collective action, within anarchical framework qualitatively distinct from the interstate 
anarchy.  The key challenge is is to redefine the concept of power, from state to non-
state actors. Which is why the research question is designed to deal with that issue 
specifically. I seek to test the applicability of Social Network Analysis (SNA) as a 
means to do so. If  the SNA approach proves fruitful in the case of humanitarian 
governance, it might be exportable to other areas of transnational governance as well.
Beyond the theoretical relevance I would also argue that the transnational governance 
of humanitarianism is of great import- in and of itself. Humanitarian Aid is a multi- 
billion dollar field. Western states still give more in humanitarian relief than they do in 
development aid- and while all figures remain uncertain estimates ,the sum of 
humanitarian aid channelled from governments is above 11 billion USD.  Adding 
private funding to this figure would dramatically increase it- though it is hard to 
estimate by how much (See Randal 2011). These funds are channelled through 
humanitarian organisations. How many organisations is unclear, but the most dramatic 
estimates claim that there could be as many as 4000 humanitarian organisations 
operating from Western states (see Macrae and Harmer 2003:23-26). Humanitarians 
provide a vital life-line for people all over the globe- the mistakes and successes of 
these organisations can have a major impact on entire populations. The governance of 
these organisations should be an area of interest for IR scholars.
3 Theory and Earlier Research
3.1 A short history of humanitarian governance
Any narrative of the emergence of humanitarian governance must inevitably begin 
with the catastrophic humanitarian response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The 
series of mistakes made by the actors on the ground and -arguably- the failure of the 
entire sector, became a catalyst for a series of self-regulation initiatives. The 
accusations against the humanitarian community's actions in Rwanda were quite 
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severe: they   prolonged the genocide by actively promoting ceasefire, they 
inadvertently provided logistical support to Interahamwe militia in exile, and they 
actively hampered the new Rwandan governments attempts at establishing effective 
sovereignty within their territories. (De Waal 1997: 192-197)
As shall be discussed below, these events provoked some harsh criticisms of the sector 
from the academic community. Beyond the discussions of scholars, for the 
humanitarian organisations themselves, the most significant interpretations of the 
failures were published in the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 
(JEEAR) -in the third study conducted by ODI (1996). 
This study concluded that some "form of regulation or enforcement is needed to ensure 
improvements in performance by NGOs"(ODI 1996: 196). The study recommended 
establishing an international accreditation system, developed jointly by official 
agencies and NGOs. These were to be upheld by an unspecified entity to "administer 
accreditation, funding, reporting relationships, etc". As a second option they 
recommended self-managed regulation. They emphasised that this method would only 
be sufficient if donors reserved their funding for accredited organisations, and 
supported the NGO community in establishing methods of monitoring compliance 
with the common codes and standards. (ODI 1996: 197)
The findings of JEEAR had wide implications for the humanitarian community. After 
the report was published the regulatory initiatives presented came from the sector 
itself.  HAP International was established as a direct response to JAEER and a parallel 
research project on humanitarian accountability (HAP 2012). ALNAP was established 
jointly by donors and humanitarian organisations as a direct consequence of the 
JAAER evaluation (ALNAP 2012). The SPHERE project, though not tied directly to 
JAEER, was still a result of post-Rwanda discussions between Oxfam and IFRC in 
Europe, and a post-Rwanda conference held by InterAction in the United States 
(Buchanan-Smith 2003). 
While the NGO-community was active, the newly established Department for 
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)- later to become OCHA, was struggling to establish its' 
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role as coordinator of the sector. DHA had been established out of the desire to 
coordinate the efforts of UN and NGO humanitarian organisations by General 
Assembly resolution (UNGA 1992). However, their funding was limited and, as Weiss 
(1998) argues, the the qualifications of its' staff was even more so. This made it very 
difficult for them to exert any authority. In the years between 1992 and 1997, their 
primary objective was to gain authority over the other operative UN agencies- which 
they inevitably failed to accomplish.
Meanwhile, the first Sphere handbook was published in 2000 and rapidly became one 
of the most widespread sets of common standards in the sector (Hilhorst 2002: 201). 
Some critics claimed that despite enjoying  vocal support from prominent 
humanitarians, the Sphere-standards were not broadly used in a field setting: Hugo 
Slim (cited in Borton 2009: 21) noted a “high talk up but low take-up of the SPHERE 
standards” None the less, it seemed evident that the Sphere-project had achieved what 
DHA had failed to accomplish: they had produced an instrument of governance that 
was endorsed by both UN agencies and the NGO-community alike (Sphere 2012). 
Created by NGOs, the Sphere standards were now being used by heavy UN-agencies 
(c.f. WFP and UNHCR 2008).
In a parallel development DHA, now named OCHA, produced the so called cluster-
approach, in which lead agencies are given mandate to coordinate -and held directly 
accountable for- an entire section of the humanitarian response (logistics, shelter, food 
distribution etc.). This approach was first tested in response to the Pakistani 
earthquakes of 2005. Subsequent evaluations concluded that the approach had 
presented some moderate success in predictability, but also noted that the 
institutionalisation of the approach left much to be desired (Stoddard, Harmer et al. 
2007: 45). 
Approximately ten years after Rwanda, another major evaluation was produced in 
response to the Indian Ocean tsunami (see Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 2006). This 
was the biggest joint evaluation since JEEAR. For the humanitarian community the 
evaluation had the potential to answer the major question: had the work towards 
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governance of the sector born tangible fruit? The conclusions were cautiously 
optimistic, but the evaluation still described several of the same issues that had been 
revealed by JEEAR. As Hofmann (2011) succinctly summarised it:
[T]he sector has developed a series of codes and standards to regulate itself. While  
these have gone some way to improve the quality and accountability of  
humanitarian assistance, there are limits to what can be achieved through self-
regulation. As far back as 1996, [JEEAR] clearly stated that the development of  
codes and standards is not enough. […] Ten years later, the joint evaluation of the  
tsunami response made a similar recommendation. 
Today, fifteen years after Rwanda, humanitarian governance has continued to evolve 
into an ever more complex network of umbrella organisations, common standards, 
accountability practices, codes of conduct, and joint statements on principles. From 
human resource policies towards their staff (People in Aid 2008), to broad platforms 
defining humanitarianism (Global Humanitarian Platform 2007), these diverse 
organisational phenomena seek to establish global rules for the humanitarian sector. 
What they all have in common is that membership is voluntary, and formal 
enforcement-mechanisms are weak- or non-existent. 
3.2 Earlier research on Humanitarian organisations
The systematic research on humanitarianism has its' origin from the period after 
Rwanda 1994. Consequentially, early works on humanitarian organisations were 
heavily influenced by disillusionment with the universal goodness of humanitarian 
values. Humanitarianism had captured the public imagination as an “activity that is 
wholly admirable, that one need not view sceptically” (Reiff 1997:132) Against this 
backdrop- and confronted with the failures in Rwanda- the critical focus of the early 
research becomes understandable. DeWaals (1997) book Famine Crimes, sparked the 
debate by pointing out how the self-interested actions of humanitarian organisations 
could harm those they were supposed to aid. Variations of this theme became 
dominant within the field. Reiff (1997: 133) endorsed the claim that humanitarianism 
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is a business where the organisations were not always capable of seeing the 
beneficiaries as their customers. Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 725) characterised the 
professionalisation of humanitarianism as a bureaucratisation that led to pathological 
failures in the emerging sectors ability to achieve optimal outcomes. Smillie and 
Minear (2004: 183) published a work based on a rationalist model for humanitarian 
agency. According to them humanitarian organisations engage in a “dog-eat-dog 
competition, that is as relentless as it is unconstructive [sic].” They blamed sub-
optimal outcomes on an imperfect market,corrupted by skewered incentives and mixed 
interests. In reviewing the literature on humanitarianism, Kennedy (2011: 2) concluded 
that “those reading contemporary research on humanitarianism would be forgiven for 
believing that humanitarianism is in a sorry state indeed.”
It is not difficult to spot the red-tread throughout this research. The dominant 
perspective is that of rational choice with regards to funding. I will argue below that 
the complex pattern of typologies and cleavages weakens the case for a simplified 
rational choice model- at least limited to funding. However, the rational choice focus 
of the earlier research does prompt a quick discussion of humanitarian governance as 
collective action.
3.3 Humanitarian Governance and Collective Action
Several of the core issues confronting the humanitarian community- the humanitarian 
dilemmas (see Barnett and Weiss 2011), can be described as problems of collective 
actions. For the sake of this discussion, let collective action problems exists when 
individual rational behaviour can plausibly lead to a strictly pareto-inferior outcome.
(Cook and Levi 1990: 223)  So the corollary becomes that some form of governing 
mechanism would be advantageous to all actors. To begin with an unlikely case, 
consider human resource policies as an example. Professionalisation of the sector 
requires personnel that stay on for longer periods of time. For this to be achievable 
salaries must be competitive and proportionate to the education and experience of the 
staff. (see Barnett and Weiss 2011: 115-7) Let us assume that all organisations desire 
professionalisation- but that high salary costs make them less attractive to donors. By 
instigating a governance mechanism that regulates human resource policies in the 
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sector- they can then achieve higher professionalism while maintaining a levelled 
playing field. Likewise, the question of humanitarian-military collaboration can be 
seen as a collective action problem. The distinction between humanitarian 
organisations and military actors is a common good- if one organisation associates 
with the military then all others will bear the cost. Humanitarians in general will be 
associated with actors in the conflict- thereby reducing the security of the sector as a 
whole. (see Barnett and Weiss 2011: 110-2) In this situation standard rational choice 
theory would predict a race to the bottom, where all humanitarian organisations seek to 
maximise their own security by collaborating with armed actors. This logic can be 
applied to any number of issues confronting the humanitarian field.
However, the simple elegance of this rational choice approach to humanitarian 
governance is achieved at a cost. It assumes that the interests of the actors are 
identical. This is not the case. Humanitarian actors are split along several cleavages- 
and humanitarian governance becomes more than simply achieving optimal-outcomes. 
It becomes a political contest. 
3.4 Divergent interests: Humanitarian heterogeneity
A colloquial definition of politics is that it is the process by which groups representing 
divergent interests and values make collective decisions. In the previous section it was 
shown that collective decisions might be of advantage to the humanitarian sector. The 
discussion was conducted under the assumption that the humanitarian sector was 
homogeneous in terms of preferences and interests. In this section it will be shown that 
the process to establish joint decisions is political; precisely because the assumption of 
humanitarian homogeneity is faulty. 
3.4.1 Typologies and cleavages
The fauna of international organisations that fall under Barnett's definition of 
humanitarianism is  varied. There are large IGOs, like the World Food Program, the 
mandated: "food aid arm of the United Nations system"(WFP 2012). This is an 
organisation operative in more over 70 different states, employing in excess of 12 000 
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staff on long-term contracts, with a financial turnover of 4.2 billion dollars. (WFP 
2010) On the more modest side of the spectrum you find organisations as the 
Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights. This organisation  builds 
houses, provides medical care, and helps people find employment possibilities; in 
America- and abroad. The fiscal turnover is in excess of 70 million USD, but only 
about 4% of this is used outside of the US-border. (Heartland Alliance 2010) There are 
networks of national organisations that vary, from the strict federational form of IFRC, 
to the ACF's loose concept of shared values. There are organisation, like the ICRC, 
who pride themselves on absolute independence, and organisations like the UNHCR- 
which occasionally acts as the administrative arm of states' immigration politics. 
(Barnett and Weiss 2008, Barnett 2001)
Humanitarian variance has proved difficult to summarise in a single analytical 
framework. After conducting a survey of the typologies Macrae and Harmer (2003: 
28) where forced to conclude that:
There may in fact be no satisfactory way of categorising [humanitarian] NGOs  
according to their philosophy, and there are potentially unlimited ways of  
carving up the community according to which of the humanitarian principles and  
values are emphasised, and in what operational context.
The following summary of attempts to categorise humanitarian organisations are 
therefore not meant to be a complete list. However, for this thesis they will suffice as a 
demonstration of humanitarian heterogeneity.
3.4.2 Intergovernmental and non-governmental
This distinction has not been broadly elaborated in the literature, which seems to focus 
on the non-governmental side of humanitarianism (see Macrae and Harmer 2003; 
Schloms 2005; Weiss 1999). However, Barnett's definition of humanitarianism clearly 
incorporates IGOs- as he has repeatedly made clear (Barnett 2001; Barnett 2005; 
Barnett and Weiss 2008) . The distinction between the two are important. While NGOs 
are -at least in principle- free to change their mandate and practices, IGOs have 
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mandates given to them by states. Many IGO's are UN organisations or specialised 
agencies. They report on their ability to fulfil their mandate, either to the 
intergovernmental institution that established them, or to the UN General Assembly's 
Economic and Social Council. (UN Charter 1945: art. 55-63). So while NGOs are in 
principle free to choose their relationship with states, IGOs are irrevocably tied to 
states and their interests. 
3.4.3 Religious, Dunantists and Wilsonians
This distinction is based on the idea that modern humanitarianism has evolved from 
three different origins. These differences in origin have lead to three distinct 
humanitarian traditions: Religious, Dunantist and Wilsonian. Macrae and Harmer 
(2003: 27-28) also indicate that this division can have a geographical dimension. US 
organisations have a tendency to associate with Wilsonian ideals, while Europe has a 
stronger Dunantist affinity. The faith-based organisations tend towards a division 
between the Islamic east, and Christian west- in addition to a protestant US and 
Northern Europe and a Catholic south of Europe.
Missionary organisations, tied to European colonialism, where among the first 
manifestations of organised humanitarianism. These organisations had the ambition of 
relieving, not only the physical, but also the spiritual suffering of distant strangers. 
Today the spirit of evangelism is a bit  dampened. Catholic organisation like the CRS, 
Caritas and CAFOD, all  have a religious mandate to preach the kingdom come, but 
manage to deliver services unconditionally- and without religious bias. World Vision, 
another large organisation, closely tied to a protestant Christianity, has been 
operational in Afghanistan with a predominantly Muslim staff. The programs they 
delivered where "indistinguishable from those of secular counter-parts."(Macrae and 
Harmer 2003: 27). While the program activities might have become secularised, the 
organisations still have a clearly religious identities, and still rely on funding from 
churches and faith organisations. 
In addition to the Christian-faith organisations there has also been a recent growth in 
Islamic humanitarianism. Though based in a different faith, these organisations should 
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also be included religious humanitarianism. While the Christian organisations seem to 
have progressed towards secular programs ( Macrae and Harmer 2003, Ferris 2005), 
these organisations have been accused of being unable to distinguish between the 
religious and humanitarian agenda (see Ferris 2005: 322-323). These accusations have 
not been documented, but originate from interviews of Christian humanitarian actors. 
It cannot be concluded that Islamic organisations are less secular than their Christian 
counterparts; but it is interesting to note the tendencies towards conflict between these 
two groups.
The second tradition is the one perhaps most often identified with modern 
humanitarianism; the Dunantist tradition. This tradition derives its' name from Henri 
Dunant who established the ICRC as a response the horrific violation of civilians he 
witnessed in the battle of Solferino in 1859. The tradition focuses on protection of 
civilians and the proliferation of international humanitarian law. A major ideal is 
independence from states, religions and other potential sources of conflict. 
Philosophically it is based on the idea of a universal humanitarian imperative- to aid 
and protect those who suffer. While the ICRC cannot technically be described as an 
NGO, several of the worlds largest humanitarian NGOs belong to this tradition: Save 
the Children was established to aid orphans of the first world war, Oxfam to provide 
food aid to occupied Greece during the second world war, and MSF, while established 
in opposition to the ICRC's handling of the Biafra emergency in 1970, still falls under 
the broad umbrella of the Dunantist tradition. (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 27-28)
The third tradition is the Wilsonian tradition- deriving its' name from American 
president Woodrow Wilson. After world war two, the Marshal Plan was instigated -not 
only to alleviate the suffering of the Europeans- but also to build a transatlantic 
partnership between the US and the European powers. This was the first manifestation 
of a modern a Wilsonian humanitarianism. This tradition does not see a clear cut 
distinction between humanitarianism and state-interests. Staff typically move freely- 
and frequently- between government offices and NGOs. They typically have little or 
no qualms about relying on state funding, and do not really concern themselves with 
how their work might serve state interests. (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 27) In broader 
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IR-theory, Wilsonian humanitarianism even has a neo-realist justification from the 
state's perspective. Nye(2008: 94) emphasise the concept of soft power as "the ability 
to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than 
coercion or payment." Wilsonian humanitarianism is assumed to build attraction and 
therefore increases the states ability to obtain desired outcomes.
3.4.4 Classicist and Solidarists
In 1971 MSF was established in protest to the ICRC's handling of the Biafra crisis. 
French doctors, returning from the field, were outraged at the ICRC's perceived 
complacency in the face of the atrocities committed by the Nigerian army. The MSF 
has later evolved into an organisation that is markedly different from its' Red Cross 
origins. Reiss (1999 cited in Macrae and Harmer 2003) proposes a spectrum, from 
Classicist to Solidarist, to capture this difference in humanitarian approaches. 
Organisations affiliated with the Red Cross movement are usually found on the 
Classicist side of the spectrum. These organisations eschew public confrontation, 
avoid taking sides, deliver aid according to principles of non-discrimination, and rely 
completely on the consent of all conflicting parties. MSF is found on the opposite side 
of the spectrum, which Reiss calls Solidarist. These organisations advocate 
controversial policy, take the sides of the victims, skews the balance of resource 
allocation, and overrides sovereignty when necessary. (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 28-
29)
The key distinction is that between independence and neutrality. Solidarist 
organisations are avidly independent, as are classicist, but they differ on the weight 
they attach to neutrality. This distinction is more than simply a difference in practice, 
the divide between solidarists and classicists is fundamentally ideological. The best 
known formulation of the classicist ideal is to be found in the ICRC's mission 
statement: "ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose 
exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war 
and internal violence and to provide them with assistance."  (ICRC 2012) A rather 
poetic formulation of the solidarist ideology was provided in Orbinski's Nobel Peace 
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Prize acceptance speech on behalf of MSF:
Humanitarian action is more than simple generosity, simple charity. It aims to  
build spaces of normalcy in the midst of what is profoundly abnormal. More than  
offering material assistance, we aim to enable individuals to regain their rights [.  
. .] Our action and our voice is an act of indignation, a refusal to accept an  
active or passive assault on the other. (Orbinski 1999)
The classicist-solidarist spectrum is not only applicable to MSF and ICRC. NGOs 
based in Nordic countries are known for being unapologetically Solidarist, the faith-
based organisations included. British based organisations, such as OXFAM, are also 
known to have Solidarist tendencies, while perhaps not to the extreme of their French 
counterparts. (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 27-28)
3.4.5 Funding and donors
Another way to categorise humanitarian organisations is by their sources of funding; 
the typical distinction is made between private and public. Private funding, from 
individuals, corporations, or religious societies, are usually less conditional- and 
therefore leave organisation more independent. Public funding, that is funding from 
states, can be given on conditions of specific usage, or for specific programs and 
projects. However, the distinction is not categorical, as most large humanitarian 
organisations rely on a combination of private and public funding. (Macrae and 
Harmer 2003: 28-9). 
There is also a large diversity in how states act as donors. ECHO, for instance,  has a 
rigorous reporting and accountability policies -even taking the step of conducting their 
own field monitoring of the humanitarian activities they finance. For gulf-state donors, 
the Islamic concept of zakat, or charity, hinders active accountability practices because 
the size and content of donations are to be kept private in accordance with the Qur'an. 
A common distinction is that between states that are members of OECD and  the new 
donors, including China, the gulf states, and the rising Asian economies. However, 
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lack of data and research means that there are few theories as to how these different 
donors shape the actions of the humanitarian organisations that they finance.
(Harmer and Cotterell 2009)
3.4.6 Affective, introvert and extrovert organisations
Another interesting typology is provided by Schloms (2006). His method is descriptive 
ethics and his focus is on the field-staff of humanitarian organisations.  He analyses 
the choices and legitimisation of organisations faced with a humanitarian dilemma: 
weighing the short-term provision of relief against long-term considerations of justice. 
In mapping out the responses he found a pattern between organisational form and the 
source used for justifying the choice. His differentiation between introvert, extrovert 
and affective organisations is based on the sources the staff use to legitimise their 
response to the moral dilemma.
The introvert approach is to look toward the organisations internal standards for 
guidance. Central tenants for the field workers moral doctrine are the organisations 
mandate and principles. For a more detailed instruction, standard procedures and 
working principles are seen as a manifestations of these. Schloms mentions UN-
organisations and the ICRC as prime examples of the the introvert response. Whether 
field workers revere the UN-charter or the Geneva Conventions, these doctrines are 
seen as a high ideal, which legitimise the moral detailed guidelines. These 
organisations tend have large mandates, objective criteria for needs assessments, and 
espouse to a doctrine of humanitarian neutrality. Politics are seen as the environment 
within which humanitarians operate.
The extrovert approach draws its moral reasoning from the situation in which the 
humanitarians operate. Right or wrong is determined by whether one stands on the side 
of the victims or the aggressors. In response to the specific dilemma posed by Scloms, 
these organisations view withdrawal of humanitarian aid as the last resort in the 
political tool-chest. They are none the less willing to use that tool when necessary. 
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MSF and MDM are naturally mentioned as prime examples of extrovert organisations. 
According to Schloms these organisations tend to have narrow mandates, they 
prioritise beneficiaries by political and social criteria, and maintain an unapologetically 
political profile. They typically view states as the adversaries of the humanitarians.
The Affective approach is an emotional reaction rather than a deliberate strategy. The 
act of providing assistance is seen as an act of pity and charity- rather than a response 
to the beneficiary's right to  assistance. From this perspective there is really no 
dilemma between politics and humanitarianism, there are only needs and deeds. 
Organisations with this approach tend to have broad mandates and a broad variance in 
their programs. They consider themselves apolitical but have no strict distinction 
between the political and humanitarian arenas.
(Schloms 2006)
3.5 Governance, divergent interest and the relevance of power
The variance within the humanitarian sector has been characterised as a "crisis of 
coherence" (Schloms 2006) and "an anxious collective identity crisis" (Barnett 2011: 
3). In trying to outline the sources of interests in the humanitarian sector Similie and 
Minear (2004: 9) described it as "a mishmash of politics , economics, commercial 
calculation, guilt, and solidarity." A consequence  this mosaic of ideologies, 
approaches, organisational forms, and funding sources, is that the organisations have 
diverging interests as to what form and content they desire for humanitarian 
governance. Any agency model with an ambition to explain humanitarian governance 
must therefore take these diverging interests into account.
3.6 Humanitarian Agency
The most systematic summary of humanitarian agency models can be found in 
Kennedy (2011: 21-25). He proposes four models of humanitarian agency with regards 
to governance: the instrumentally rational model, the value rational model, the social 
structural model and the integrative model. He does not explicitly discuss the model of 
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rational self-interest with regards to funding, but  found it -as I did-  appropriate to 
discard this approach from the outset (Kennedy 2011: 2).
The instrumental rationality model sees humanitarian actors as responding to a 
practical challenge in effecting their work. In discussing need for humanitarian 
governance above I implicitly assumed an instrumentally rational model of 
humanitarian agency. From this point of view the sector is being governed in direct 
response to the need for governance. The humanitarian actors are simply attempting to 
achieve optimal outcomes by collective action. The weakness of this approach is that it 
depoliticises humanitarian governance and, as shown in the discussion of divergent 
interests, this is not a viable option. There might well be an instrumental need for 
humanitarian governance, but the actors are not in agreement as to what this entails.
The value rational model sees humanitarian organisations as primarily ethical agents. 
They act in accordance with ethical systems, or systems of values (Kennedy 2011: 22). 
This is a better fit with regards to the divergent interests. Several of the key cleavages 
are based on competing sets of values for what humanitarianism should be; they are 
conflict over what constitutes the true humanitarianism. However, this models 
weakness is that it fails to provide the element of a strategic agency. It is well and 
good to consider humanitarian organisations ethical agents, but more difficult to 
follow this line of reasoning to its conclusion in terms of the chosen actions. It is also 
difficult to see how it can be of help in defining power. How does a humanitarian 
organisation impose their sets of values on other actors- and why should they wish to? 
Should power be measured in rhetorical skill – or abilities in formal ethical reasoning?
The structural model of humanitarian organisations, views organisations as responding 
to a shifting external environment. The core argument is that the context in which 
humanitarians are operating is  in constant flux, rendering the humanitarians of-
balance in terms of how they react. Actions of humanitarian organisations is 
understood as reactions to external change (Kennedy 2011). This model corresponds 
with Barnett's (2009) evolutionary perspective on humanitarian organisations: 
humanitarian organisations must adapt constantly to changes in the environment, or 
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face extinction. This model too has clear merits, but it does not provide much help 
with regards to the question of power. The governance is contested among the 
humanitarian organisations- and it is from this conflict that different governing 
mechanisms and initiatives arise. While change in the context challenges existing modi 
operandi- this observation does not provide an adequate answer to how one 
humanitarian organisation can influence another.
The fourth model, the integrative approach to humanitarian agency, is a bit more 
complex than the others. It builds on the idea of the organisational field- defined as an 
area of activity upon which the interests of the actors converge. The humanitarian field 
is defined by humanitarianism as an activity in which all the organisations have a 
stake. (Kennedy 2011: 25) The concept of fields was first proposed by Bourdieu (eg. 
1984), and has later been adapted to fit organisational practices by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983). Kennedy argues that the concept of the field better captures the 
humanitarianism than the competing concepts of regimes, epistemic community and 
network. With regards to networks, Kennedy (2011: 26) notes that "it is true that in 
many ways humanitarianism functions through network form", but continues to argue 
that the network concept focus too much on formal patterns of interaction and "lacks 
an argument about structure- about the network playing a role other than organising 
exchange." I disagree with this view on networks, and in the necessity of 
dichotomising field and network as analytical approaches. So while I have built on 
Kennedy (2011: 24-33), the following description of the integrative model of 
humanitarian agency has been adapted to accommodate my inclusion of the network 
concept.
The integrative model assumes that what humanitarian organisations desire is 
legitimacy. In Bourdieu's terms, legitimacy is the symbolic capital of the humanitarian 
field. The capital against which all other forms of capital are measured. When asking if 
a humanitarian organisation is successful, it is a question of how legitimate they are. 
So how does a humanitarian organisation achieve legitimacy? 
Humanitarian organisations can use different capitals to build legitimacy. Capital -in 
Humanitarian Governance: Network, Agency and Power
Theory and Earlier Research 24
this sense- is  anything that can promote legitimacy. This is a  very broad definition of 
capital- but the types of capital that can produce legitimacy are too many and varied 
for precision. The ICRCs special mandate and protection under the Geneva 
Convention (1946: art. 3, 9, 11, 12) can provide legitimacy as external recognition. 
The MSF's Nobel Prize from 1999 can do the same for them. A large organisation, 
with operations in many different emergencies, can gain legitimacy from their size. 
UNHCR can be perceived as especially legitimate with regards to refugees- not only 
because of their special position granted in the Refugee Convention (1951)- but also 
because they have niche competence with regards to forced migration situations. An 
organisation- such as MSF- can gain legitimacy from their independence from state 
funding, whereas others can gain recognition for their cooperation with state donors. 
The forms of capital in the diagram below are not intended as an exhaustive list, but 
merely a few examples of what can constitute capital in the field of humanitarianism.
There are many forms of capital in the humanitarian field. The key element in the 
integrative model is not a limited list of capital forms, but rather the observation that 
the value of the capital can be manipulated by strategic agency. Forms of capital can 
be fungible, allowing for creative trade-offs between organisations. Another key 
observation of this model is that it illustrates precisely why humanitarian governance 
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is political. Codification of humanitarian principles and precise definitions of correct 
humanitarian practice- will inevitably increase the value of the available capital for 
some- and decrease it for others.
Consider the question of accountability. The down-ward accountability to the 
beneficiaries, as proposed by the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (see HAP 
2012), might appeal to certain Dunantist organisations, while for the Wilsonians, with 
their close connection to states as donors, this codification of accountability will either 
decrease their funding- or the legitimacy of their operative work. The minimum 
standards proposed by Sphere (see The Sphere Project 2011), will make it difficult for 
Solidarist organisations to be selective about who they prioritise for aid delivery. Their 
freedom to treat a humanitarian disaster as a political problem, as well as their freedom 
to pick sides, is a vital capital form for them. Loosing this freedom reduces their 
legitimacy. 
So the question of humanitarian governance is a question of defining legitimacy. The 
different organisations all posses different forms of capital- but how much this capital 
is worth is dependent on what gets defined as legitimate. The purpose of using power 
is therefore to shape the development of humanitarian governance so as to maximise 
the value of the organisations capital- and thereby increase the organisations 
legitimacy
3.7 Theoretical definition of power
So how does the integrated model provide a definition of power with regards to 
governance of the humanitarian field? How is it conceivable that a humanitarian 
organisation can alter the actions of another- possibly against its' strategic interest? 
There are no conventional coercive courses of action available, but that is not to say 
there is no influence. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) presented the idea of isomorphic process to explain how 
organisations in a field converge towards the same logics of practice over time. An 
isomorphic process is a constraining process that causes one unit in a population to 
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resemble others that are facing the same environmental conditions. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983: 150) outline three ways in which such a process can take shape: “1) 
coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of 
legitimacy; 2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; 
and 3) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization.” 
Of these, mimetic isomorphism is the most relevant to the humanitarian field. Mimetic 
isomorphism is caused by uncertainty rather than coercion. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983:151) argue that “when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates 
symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organization.” As 
has been demonstrated in the earlier discussion, ambiguous goals and an environment 
of uncertainty are fitting descriptions of the operational context of humanitarian 
organisations. Mimetic isomorphism is a means by which organisations can overcome 
this uncertainty. By modelling their organisations on others, which they see as 
successful, they can find solutions to their predicament in a cost-efficient manner. The 
mimetic response to uncertainty can be seen as a rational choice, as the alternative cost 
of reinventing the wheel is probably higher than the cost of mimicry. (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983:151) 
An example of mimetic responses, causing an isomorphic process, is the spread of 
corporate structures among multinational humanitarian organisations. While World 
Vision and Care International, always had a clear corporate structure organising their 
national branches, OXFAM International and MSF International would function more 
as loose networks. However, in recent years OXFAM and MSF have implemented 
policies that gradually make them resemble the corporate structures of World Vision 
and Care. (Stoddard 2003: 26) Simeant (2005) conducted a study of French 
multinational humanitarian NGOs, that demonstrated a growing difference in practice 
and policy between different national affiliations of the same organisation. Faced with 
the uncertainty and growing doubt with regards to collective identity, it is plausible 
that MSF and OXFAM looked to organisations that successfully maintained common 
practices for inspiration.  
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Humanitarian organisations will- as other organisations- be guided in how they operate 
by the practices they see as successful by other organisations. To tie this discussion in 
with the chosen model of humanitarian agency, they will converge against the 
practices of the most legitimate organisations. Yet who they see as most legitimate will 
depend on who they are. While operational capacity is a constant form of capital for all 
humanitarian organisations- the capital forms tied to identity or success within key 
niches are not. 
While both MSF and ICRC are regarded as highly legitimate actors, they are non-
compatible forms of legitimacy; one is based on neutrality the other on the freedom to 
act politically. So while both organisations might have the capacity to be the objects 
upon which other organisations mould their isomorphic adaptations- this will most 
likely be the case for different organisations. On questions regarding the relationship 
between politics and humanitarianism, Solidarists are more likely to follow MSF, 
while Classicist are more likely to follow ICRC. Isomorphism occurs along the route 
of least resistance.
As a consequence of this, social capital becomes the most important power-resource in 
humanitarian governance. The actors wish to achieve the broadest possible governance 
mechanisms that increases the value of their particular capitals- so as to increase their 
legitimacy. The broader a governance mechanism, the greater its' effect on what is 
defined as legitimate. When they are negotiating the form and content of these 
governance mechanisms- it is a bargaining process where each organisation seeks to 
maximise their gain. What can they use as a power-resource in this situation?
If an organisation is likely to be followed by many others, it is more likely to force 
through its' agenda. The threat of exit, perhaps the only threat available in 
humanitarian negotiations, becomes a lot more effective if this also entails the loss of 
support from several other actors. However, the process becomes more convoluted as 
the humanitarian field is fractured on so many dimensions. Some cleavages are 
crossing, such as Dunantist-Wilsonian and Classicist-Solidarist, while others are 
parallel such as Affective-Introvert and Dunantist Wilsonian. It is not just how many 
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organisations that recognise an actors legitimacy, there is also a structural element in 
how the position of the actor is advantageous in promoting any singular governance 
mechanism. An actor well placed to gather the support of both Dunantists and 
Wilsonians will have more significance in the process- and therefore also be better 
equipped to promote its' own interests. The Bourdieuian concept of social capital 
needs to be expanded to become a composite measure of relational power. For this I 
turn to Social Network Analysis. 
There are at least three ways in which relational power can manifest. The first is 
participation. In order to have any chance of impacting the outcome- an organisation 
must first of all be present during the discussion. Assuming participation, the next is 
their value in promoting the initiative produced in the discussion. The greater an 
organisations importance in promoting an initiative- the more likely it is to 
successfully alter compromises in their favour. The importance of the organisations 
has to sides, the first its' ability to reach other actors. The more actors an organisations 
can reach and influence- the more valuable the organisation is for the initiative. 
However, if several other organisations present in the discussion can reach the same 
organisations- then this power is somewhat diminished. Therefore brokerage becomes 
the second source of power. An organisation well placed between two groups of 
organisations that are otherwise poorly connected- will have an negotiation advantage, 
as it can influence actors the governing initiative would otherwise not reach. 
3.8 Hypotheses
The theoretical definition of power can be operationalised- as shall be extensively 
discussed below. However, the validity of the theory cannot simply be confirmed by 
measuring an indicator. If my concept of relational power is to be considered valid- it 
is dependent on the applicability of the agency model and the observed importance of 
relational power in the humanitarian governance network. The structures of interaction 
must also lend themselves to my notion of the transnational humanitarian anarchy. 
That is it must consist of “voluntary associations [in] an interwoven network, 
composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations” and perhaps more to the 
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point, obedience cannot be subjugated to any single authority (Kropotkin 1910). The 
scientific language of testable hypothesis will be used to test for these assumptions, 
however, these are not hypothesis in the strict sense that they allow for falsification 
with a known probability of error. They do allow for falsification, in the sense that my 
assumption can be disproved, but the research design has no direct means of securing 
against a Robinson-Crusoe-Fallacy (see Tsebelis 1989). While a deductive logic is 
used to present hypothesis that can be tested against observation, it cannot be denied 
that the observations might be a consequence of a different phenomena. Stating my 
assumptions as hypothesis is therefore done primarily for the sake of clarity- not out of 
an ambition to provide undeniable proof. 
3.8.1 Structural Hypotheses
If the integrative model is to fit the data, certain structural observations should be 
expected. The first is hierarchy in the network, the second is anarchy in the central 
network, the third is a relative high number of unique member constellations. 
If organisations are to relate to an isomorphic leader, it would be expected that these 
leaders present themselves as tops of a hierarchy. There should, in other words, be 
evidence of hierarchical organisation in the humanitarian governance network, leading 
to the following hypothesis:
H1: The humanitarian governance network will have hierarchical tendencies
Somewhat paradoxically, the second assumption in the theory is that there will be no 
hierarchy. If the idea of the transnational humanitarian anarchy is to be valid- 
obedience cannot be subjugated to any single authority . This is resolved by assuming 
that as one approaches the centre of power in the network- the degree of hierarchy 
diminishes. Leading to the second hypothesis:
H2: The hierarchical tendencies of the humanitarian governance network will decline 
as one trims the network boundaries towards the core network.
I have argued that there are several cleavages dividing the humanitarian community- 
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which in turn allows for several possible positions in the network. If this is to be true, 
there must be a sufficiently high number of unique membership combinations in the 
network. If the constellations of interests in the humanitarian field is spread, then the 
concept of relational power becomes applicable. However, if there are only a few 
unique constellations- it is more likely that other power-resources (or Bourdieuian 
capitals) play a larger role. So what can constitute a sufficiently high number of unique 
constellations? This number inevitably becomes a bit arbitrary. However, assuming 
that my discussion of typologies and cleavages constitutes a minimum  estimate of 
cleavages in the humanitarian field. Further, assuming that all actors can position on 
any combination of positions on these cleavages. Then an estimate of the absolute 
minimum expected unique combinations can be produced. There are five cleavages 
described, assuming two possible positions with regards to each, there are 323 possible 
unique positions. This is an absolute minimum: so the result will become dubious as it 
approaches 32. Leading to the hypthesis:
H3: There will be at least 32 unique constellations of membership in the humanitarian 
governance network.
3.8.2 Agency Hypotheses
For the concept of relational power to bear relevance to the humanitarian field, it is 
necessary that the integrative model of humanitarian agency is a good fit. The only 
way to evaluate the fit of an agency model is to observe behaviour. The qualitative part 
of this analysis investigates the behaviour of four organisations in the network, chosen 
by  most-different criteria (see Gerring 2007) . These cases can be seen as 
representative of highly differed organisations- so if their behaviour confirms the 
expectations of the agency model, this strengthens the case for the models 
applicability. The model assumes that the pursuit of legitimacy is the primal 
motivation for humanitarian organisations- its' main competitor assumes that funding 
is primal. Therefore the first qualitative hypothesis is that:
3 2^5 = all possible combinations of two values along 5 categories = 32
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H4: Humanitarian organisations will value legitimacy over funding concerns when 
they interact with the humanitarian governance network.
Secondly, the agency model assumes that humanitarian organisations will wish to use 
the governing mechanisms to promote the value of their specific forms of legitimacy. 
This should manifest in observable strategic attempts at influencing the governance 
mechanism. The next hypothesis is that:
H5: The modus operandi of the humanitarian organisations will influence their desired 
outcomes from the governing mechanisms.
I have deduced the primacy of relational power over other forms of influence. If this is 
to be a valid conjecture it should manifest as the strategic use of relational power to 
achieve desired outcomes.
H6: The humanitarian organisations will attempt strategic use of their relational power 
resources to exert influence over the humanitarian governing mechanisms.
If relational power is as important as I have proposed- then the success or failure of 
such strategic moves should also be explainable in terms of the relational power 
resources available. Leading to the final hypothesis: 
H7: The success or failure of attempts to strategically manipulate the humanitarian 
governance network should be explainable as consequence of available relational 
power resources. 
4 3. Method: Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
4.1 Introducing SNA
While some see SNA as a logical continuation of network theories within sociology 
(see Scott 1988), SNA in its modern form is very much a child of graph theory. It is 
based on mathematical concepts for visually representing relations between actors 
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005). While initially a graphical curiosity, the social sciences 
and humanities soon discovered the advantages of formal mathematical data to 
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represent relations. In history, the most celebrated example of SNA in practice is 
Padget and Ansell's (1993) analysis of the Medici's rise to power in Florence. Through 
a detailed analysis of the Medici families affiliations through marriages and politics- 
they show that the expansion of Medici's network into the elites was instrumental in 
their rise to power. Another use for SNA, in anthropology,  is to identify specific 
structures of relations as archetypal patterns. Recording data in mathematical form has 
allowed for a more cohesive study of kinship relations across cultures. (Hanneman and 
Riddle 2005)  The approach has spread to a broad variety of disciplines and 
substantive research areas, from administration (Cross and Andrew 2004), terrorism 
(Sageman 2004), finance and trade flows (Smith and White 1992) and the study of 
technology development clusters (Powell, Koput et al. 1996). More recently, SNA has 
made itself relevant in political science (see Kahler 2009)
So what are the core components of social network analysis? The first thing to note is 
that the data is relational. That is, it registers ties between actors by the dichotomy 
present or absent. Actors in SNA are usually referred to as nodes; a heritage from the 
its' graph theoretical origins. The lines denoting a relation, are referred to as edges. In 
essence, all social network analysis is based on data registered as nodes and edges. 
This data can be registered in a familiar form for political science: the simple data 
matrix. However, unlike the case by variable format where i = cases and j= variables- 
so that a ij becomes the value of a variable for a specific case, social network 
matrices are symmetrical. In SNA matrices i is equal to j. Cases become nodes, 
registered symmetrically on i and j and the intersection a ij  in the matrix denotes 
edges as present (1) or absent (0).  The direction of the affiliation can be denoted by 
keeping the data asymmetric with regards to the diagonal4. 
So, ∑
i=1
i=n
∑
j=1
j=i
a ij=∑ relations i→ j and likewise ∑
j=1
j=m
∑
i=1
i= j
a ij=∑ relations j→ i
To illustrate with the form of an archetypal matrix:
4 The diagonal would denote a relationship to oneself- and therefore has no meaning. To avoid confusion in 
calculations the diagonal is usually coded zero. If the diagonal is coded (1) the equations must excluded the 
diagonal by specifying the j=i-1 and i=j-1
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With an understanding of the data format, most SNA measures become quite intuitive. 
Network Density, as an example, denotes the proportion of all possible edges present 
by:
Network Density=
∑
i=1
i=n
∑
j=1
j=n
n2−n
, as i and j are symmetric, m = n
(Scott 1988; de Nooy, Mrvar et al. 2005; Hanneman and Riddle 2005) The other 
measures- intended for measurement of power in networks- will be discussed later.
The formal methods of SNA are mathematical; yet they are not statistical (Hanneman 
and Riddle 2005). Consider the common distinction in political science between large-
n and small-n studies (see Gerring 2007: 17-62). Where should one place network 
analysis? If one considers each node a case- it is natural to view it as a large-n 
approach. However, the observations are not independent of each other, nor can they 
be viewed as a representative sample of a larger population. As shall be discussed 
later, several mathematical measure can be produced as descriptives of different 
positions in the network. When the structural position of a single node is investigated- 
that node is referred to as the ego-node. SNA measures of the structural position of an 
ego-node is not dependent on qualities of that node- but rather its' relation with other 
nodes. Measures can be produced for every node in the network, but these are not 
variables in a statistical sense. They are more accurately described as measures of the 
network structure using different nodes as egos. SNA is therefore an analysis of a 
network as a single case: the item being analysed is the relations between nodes within 
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j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 […] j=n
i=1 0 1 1 1 0 0
i=2 1 0 1 0 1 0
i=3 1 1 0 0 1 1
i=4 0 1 1 0 1 1
[…] 0 1 0 1 0 0
i=n 1 1 0 1 0 0
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a single structure. 
4.2 Structure, Agency and Causality in SNA
The above has been a description of the empirical aspect of SNA, but SNA is more 
than an empirical approach. It is also a distinct theoretical discipline. Akin to rational 
choice theory, it is a set of axioms on which formal theoretical concepts can be 
developed. Unlike rational choice, these axioms are not always expressed- and 
therefore seem more as presuppositions. The underlying assumptions in SNA theory 
can be summarised as follows: 
1) Actors (as nodes) are aspects of a structure rather than agents with an 
independent capacity of choice.
2) To the extent that actors (as nodes) have interests- theses are presumed to be 
equal prior to network positions.
3) Power is determined by structural position. Actors are presumed to initially 
have equal power and influence.
(Adapted from Lake and Hong 2009: 130-131)
In terms of the structure-agency debate (see McAnulla 2002) SNA places itself on the 
diametrically opposite position of rational choice; structure is systematically given 
precedence over agency. The direction of causality is exclusively from structure to 
agency- and from structure to outcome. (Hafner-Burton, Kahler et al. 2009; Lake and 
Hong 2009). Because of this, combining SNA with political analysis, where agency is 
usually considered causally prior to structure (see eg. Malnes 2008)- can be somewhat 
problematic.
4.3 SNA: Relevant for Humanitarian Governance?
Let us begin with the case for SNA's relevance for humanitarian governance. First, 
humanitarianism is a field which can be described as neither as a market, hierarchy, 
nor a Hobbesian anarchy. Affiliations are voluntary and cannot be forced. Relational 
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power becomes important: you can only influence the outcome by participating- and 
only have high influence if your participation is vital to the success of the governance 
initiative. SNA is well suited for this form of power analysis. Secondly, while 
humanitarian organisations vary in size- an efficient governance mechanism needs a 
broad support in order to be successful. Admittedly, the loss of distinction between 
organisations of different size is formidable -influencing the actions of large scale 
actors will necessarily have greater impact on the field as a whole.  
Hafner-Burton, Kahler et al. (2009) warn against an unmindful import of the network 
analysis tool-kit into IR. SNA provides temptingly precise measures of relations, but 
the meanings of these measures need to be analysed in context. Because SNA is a 
formal mathematical method, applying the method requires a detailed understanding, 
not only of core concepts, but on how the mathematical measure will interact with the 
registered data. They note a tendency in the existing literature of using measures as 
indicators without due care to the underlying assumptions:
"Currently, international relations research too often deploys network concepts and  
theories that are inappropriate or grounded in unproven assumptions. Selective  
extension of existing theory and findings to international relations may also be  
misleading. [...]scholars have  made theoretical leaps, equating homophily with  
positive ties and structural equivalence with affinity; yet either or both may lead to  
competition instead of cooperation."
While SNA does provide a precise means of analysing relational power in 
humanitarian governance- it is well worth remembering that this is also the only aspect 
it can capture. While it makes sense to see relational power as an important element in 
humanitarian governance, it does not necessarily lend itself to analysis when isolated 
from the core components of agency, interest and legitimacy. What of the interaction 
between different components of power in the humanitarian field? Can relational 
power, removed from all other considerations, still be seen as a relevant measure? If 
relational power is best viewed as potential power in isolation, and depends on other 
power resources to manifest in outcomes, SNA will provide a poor picture of the 
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actual power distribution within the field.
4.4 Resolving the issues: Three-pronged analytical approach
I have argued that the crucial form of power in the humanitarian governance network 
is relational  power. However, this claim cannot be substantiated solely by illustrating 
that relational power is unevenly dispersed in the network. Identifying powerful actors 
in terms of participation, reach and brokerage- is dependent on substantial evidence 
that the agency model fits. While it is possible to test agency models on network data: 
through so called Agent-Based-Modelling  (see Bonabeau 2002). I have neither the 
available time, nor the quality of data, necessary for such an approach. Instead I have 
chosen to triangulate the methods used to study the network. In order to avoid the 
problems derived from the structural bias of  SNA, I will conducted a three-pronged 
method of analysis. First to uncover if the observed structure conforms to my 
theoretical assumptions. Secondly to uncover whether there is ground for a structural 
analysis in the observed form of agency. Finally, I will produce and evaluate the 
measures of relational power compared to the findings in the two previous sections.
4.4.1 Analysis Part-1 The transnational humanitarian anarchy
The qualities of the humanitarian governance network as a structure can reveal 
whether the assumptions inherent in the theory make themselves relevant. In the 
theory chapter I presented three hypothesis of how the network should manifests itself 
given the theory:
H1: The humanitarian governance network will have hierarchical tendencies
H2: The hierarchical tendencies of the humanitarian governance network will  
decline as one trims the network boundaries towards the core network.
H3: There will be at least 32 unique constellations of membership in the  
humanitarian governance network.
Counting the number of constellations of memberships is a self-explanatory measure. 
However, the latter two of these hypothesis require little additional specification. 
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Consider the diagram below. It can be seen as a typical depiction of a hierarchy. The 
arrows denote the direction of command- the top node is in control of the entire 
network, via two mid-level management nodes. 
Krackhardt (1994) developed a set of measures derived from the core components of 
this network. He argues that an ideal hierarchy is characterised by four main features: 
First, they are fully connected, so that no node is isolated from the chain of command. 
Secondly, it is hierarchic, by which Karckhardt implies the absence of reciprocal ties. 
Reciprocity of relations is presumed to remove hierarchy, as command cannot move 
two ways. The third component is efficiency, that any single node must answer only to 
one other node. If a node has more than one boss, this reduces the efficiency of the 
hierarchy. The final criteria is that there must be an ultimate end-node for the 
hierarchy- that is there must be an ultimate boss. Krackhard calls this measure Least 
Upper Bound- denoting the position of the ultimate node in the network. Krackhardts 
four measures range from 1 (perfect fit) to zero (total disorder) along these four 
dimensions.  
(Krackhardt 1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005)
The analysis will be repeated on different datasets that approach the central governing 
network- in order to see how hierarchical tendencies are distributed throughout the 
network. Instead of over-complicating the measures of “coreness”5 in each network- I 
5 In SNA the centre of a network is often referred to as the core defined in contrast to the periphery. Measures 
of coreness have been developed, (see Borgatti and Everett 1999) but in the context of this analysis they 
would only serve to confuse the results.
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have used a simple measure to limit the network towards the  core. The first is a 
dataset including all organisations with membership in more than one governing 
mechanism, the second is a dataset including all nodes with membership in more than 
three governing mechanisms, and the final measurement is conducted on the relations 
between the governing mechanisms. 
4.4.2 Analysis Part 2- Agency in the humanitarian governance 
network
Lake and Wendy (2009: 133) argue that "[p]ower may be weakest and, paradoxically, 
most important in the earliest stages of network formation." At the outset, in this case 
the humanitarian community before Rwanda 1994, there is no real governance 
network to speak of. From 1994, until today6, humanitarian organisations have chosen 
to associate in a variety of different ways: producing the governance structure which is 
the subject of this analysis. If it can be shown that their choices during this process 
lend themselves easily to an analysis based on the integrative model- this can 
substantiate the claim that relational power is of importance. The hypotheses 4-7 in 
derived from the theory (see above) are those relevant for this part of the analysis:
H4: Humanitarian organisations will value legitimacy over funding concerns when  
they interact with the humanitarian governance network.
H5: The modus operandi of the humanitarian organisations will influence their  
desired outcomes from the governing mechanisms.
H6: The humanitarian organisations will attempt strategic use of their relational  
power resources to exert influence over the humanitarian governing mechanisms.
H7: The success or failure of attempts to strategically manipulate the humanitarian  
governance network should in be explainable as an outcome of available relational  
power resources. 
6 To be precise:  the period between January and April 2012 when the network data was sampled and cross-
checked.
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In order to test these hypothesis- four organisations where chosen: OCHA, MSF, 
CARE, and OFADEC. These organisations differ along several dimensions. OCHA is 
the only IGO, while the others are NGOs. CARE is often described as the 
"quintessential Wilsonian" (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 33) organisation, whereas MSF 
are typical for a Solidarist organisation- and follow the Dunantist tradition of 
independence from states. Finally OFADEC is virtually non-comparable to the three 
former agencies. They are a small African NGO- which has managed to secure a 
central position in the governance network. Following the histories of these four 
organisations will provide an indication of whether the presumed commonalities in 
agency are fitting for all humanitarian organisations. As they are about as different 
from each other as humanitarian organisations can be, finding comparable 
manifestations of agency between these- strengthens the case for the integrative model 
of humanitarian agency.
4.5 Analysis Part-3: Operative definitions of relational power
Power, in social network analysis is based on theoretical analysis of how different 
positions in a network structure can provide advantage. As has been discussed, all 
nodes are implicitly assumed to have the same power and influence- prior to their 
position in the network. The power resources are seen as endogenous to the network. 
Several different theoretical approaches exists for power in social networks. Coercive 
power can occur when a central node threatens to severe the link to a weakly 
connected node (see Granovetter 1973); or influence can be exerted through filtering 
the information passed along- or the principles endorsed (see Milward and Provan 
1998). It is also been shown that central nodes can control the development of the 
network by setting conditions on participation. They can set the agenda, control 
participation and define the areas of governance- making it more likely that they will 
achieve their desired outcome (see Lake and Hong 2009: 138-45). Another power 
manoeuvre is that the central nodes can flock together, effectively establishing a centre 
of governors controlling a periphery of the governed (see e.g. Smith and White 1992). 
Frequently, power in social networks is seen as a form of centrality. However, there 
are several different theoretical justifications for the importance of centrality, 
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accompanied by different algorithms for its' measure. In the theory chapter three 
elements of relational power where described: participation, brokerage and reach. In 
the following I will show how these can be operationalised in terms of empirical SNA.
4.5.1 Participation
If an organisation is to have influence over the development of a governance 
mechanism- the first criteria is that it must participate in the discussion of the 
initiative. Likewise, if a governance mechanism is to impact the humanitarian field-  it 
is dependent on collaboration of organisations. Edges in this network are membership, 
defined as the opportunity to influence traded for a commitment to the outcome. So a 
simple measure of how many memberships an organisation has in the network, and 
how many members the governance mechanisms have, is a good operationalisation of 
how many other nodes in the network they have the potential to influence. The number 
of edges a node has is usually referred to as a degree. There is an important distinction 
between governance mechanisms on, the one hand and organisations on the other- as 
membership has a different meaning depending on whether it is membership in or 
member ship of.
For the initial in depth analysis- participation will be examined by taking a look at the 
ego-network of the organisations, that is- all the nodes with which an organisation 
shares an edge and all the edges between those nodes.  An in depth analysis of the 
nature of the relationships denoted as membership from the organisation- as well as an 
evaluation of that organisations ability to influence the governance mechanism, will 
provide a clearer image of how the organisations can influence through membership, 
and how their power resources can be utilised.    
For the analysis of the entire network, participation can be operationalised as the 
degree centrality. The degree, as mentioned, is the number of edges attached to a node. 
Freeman's (1979) degree centrality is nothing more than a nominalised expression of 
degree. Let C vi denote the number of edges connected to a node, and Cmax denote 
the theoretical maximum number of edges:
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DC=∑ 1− Cmax−CviCmax 
However, as the data in this case is substantively 2-mode. That is, ICRC can be a 
member of the Inter-Agency Standing Comittee (IASC), while the IASC cannot be a 
member of ICRC. So the theoretical maximum of possible of connections is different 
for the first and second mode of data. Conducting the calculation on the first mode of 
the 2-mode dataset requires seperate calculation for the governance mechanisms and 
humanitarian organisations. For the governance mechanisms Cmax=645 (the number 
of humanitarian organisations in the dataset), while for the humanitarian organisations
Cmax=16  (the number of governance mechanisms in the dataset). As the 
nominalisation is different- the two DC-measures are not directly comparable. (See 
Borgatti and Everett 1997)
This is the first measure of degree centrality. Another core component of participation 
is how many other organisations the ego interacts with through the governance 
mechanisms. That is- how many actors they have the potential to influence when 
participating in the governance mechanism. This is the second measure of degree 
centrality. 
4.5.2 Brokerage
Brokerage was first introduced by Granovetter (1973) whose initial observation was 
that weak ties that served as the only bridge between two groups had a high “cohesive 
power”. While Granovetter  wrote with friendship between individual people in mind- 
the idea that a weak connection between two cliques of nodes could be important in 
social networks proved an important observation. This was later developed into the 
concept of brokerage and the parallel measure of betweenness. Whereas the degree 
centrality only measures the potential to exert influence- betweenness is a power-
resource in itself. Consider the diagram below:
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Let the nodes be actors desiring influence and the edges be communication. If Gamma 
wishes to influence the actions of Epsilon, the only way to convey that influence is via 
Alpha. This puts Alpha in a privileged position, as Alpha can choose whether to 
convey the influence or not. If Zeta, Delta, Epsilon and Beta have agreed on a common 
strategy, they are dependent on Alpha's support, not only to include Alpha in the 
strategy, but also to include Gamma. Likewise, if Epsilon wishes to influence Beta- it 
must either be via Delta or Alpha. Occupying a position on the geodesic path -the 
shortest route-  between nodes puts the actor in a position to act as broker. A broker 
can choose whether or not to convey information or exert influence. The threat of exit 
is also more efficient for a broker. Consider the consequences for the network if Alpha 
were to withdraw. Gamma would be completely isolated, and Delta become the only 
point of connection between the other nodes.
(Adapted from Freeman 1979: 220-22; Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Lake and Hong 
2009: 132)
For the in-depth analysis I will investigate the concept of brokerage rather than its' 
formal definition. The focus will be on how organisations can use their potential to 
influence others as a bargaining chip- and how this strategy succeeds or fails. The 
dataset only registers ties between organisations as forms of membership- so while I 
will use the data to show how egos reach can be extended via key brokers, the 
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identification of key brokers will not be mathematical. I will focus on the actors that 
are widely recognised as highly legitimate and influential- and let myself be guided by 
previous case studies.
For the mathematical investigation of all position in the network the concept of 
brokerage must necessarily be formalised.  Let us say that the position of brokerage 
can exist in both pure forms and partial forms. That is, the influence that can be 
exerted through brokerage is highest when a node occupies a position on the only 
geodesic path between two points. However, if there is another geodesic path occupied 
by another node- this does not cancel the brokerage. The brokerage is merely halved- 
as the advantage is now shared with another. This is justified by the assumption that 
nodes are indifferent as to which geodesic path they use. Freeman (Freeman 1979) 
sees this as a probability of brokerage bearing relevance, where it is 1/2  when shared 
with on, and 1/3 when shared with two.  Extending this thought leads to the conclusion 
that the brokerage is a fourth if shared with three nodes; a fifth if shared with four. 
Consider diagram 2. again: Alpha is situated on the only path between Epsilon, Zeta 
Delta and Beta, and Gamma. There are, in other words, four instances where Alpha is 
a pure broker.  Additionally, Alpha is on one of two possible paths between Epsilon 
and Beta. Since there is also a path between these two and Delta, this is only half a 
brokerage. Likewise, Alpha holds a position on the path between Epsilon and Zeta, as 
well as Beta and Zeta. These positions are  shared with Delta rendering it two 
additional half brokerages. This allows for a formal quantification of Alpha's position 
of brokerage- defined as the sum of all proportions of positions occupied  on the 
geodesic paths. In this case Alpha's betweenness degree is 5,5. Betweenness, in short, 
is a measure of the number of times a node occurs on a geodesic path between other 
nodes.
(Adapted from Freeman 1979; Hanneman and Riddle 2005)
To provide a formal description of Betweenness Centrality (BC) for the ego-node (k):
Let, g ij denote all geodesic paths between i and j and let g ij k denote all 
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occurrences of k along the geodesic path between i  and j.
The proportion of geodesic paths that go from i to j via k is denoted by Pk, so that,
Pk=
g ij k
g ij
To produce a total measurement of betweenness for k the Pk is calculated for all i and j  
where i≠ j≠k , when direct edges are absent:
BC k=∑
i
n
∑
j
n
Pk
The measure is then nominalised by:
nom BC k=
BC k
n2−3n−2
(Freeman 1979: 222-4)
The product is a measurement of all occurrences of betweenness positions, or all 
occurrences where a node can act as broker. This analysis is conducted on two 
different datasets: the first analysis is on the first mode of the 2-mode dataset 
transposed to an affiliations matrix, the second on the scale-free network. These 
measures weigh brokerage under to different theoretical assumptions. The first mode 
of the 2-mode dataset measures the organisations positions as brokers between 
governance mechanisms. That is- the extent to which organisations can choose to 
confer the conclusions from one forum to the other, and the importance of that role. A 
major disadvantage of this measure is that the direct ties between the second mode 
nodes (governance mechanisms) is not included- potentially providing an exaggeration 
of the brokerage in cases where the organisation is a member of two governance 
mechanisms that are themselves connected in the second mode. The second 
measurement of centrality does not have this issue, but it does have others. By 
applying the betweenness centrality measure on the scale-free network, one assumes 
the ontological equivalence between level 1 and 2 actors. This does not actually 
present a problem for the measure of BC ,but it is problematic with regards to the 
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nominalisation of the measure. There is a substantive difference with regards to the 
maximum possible number of connections to the level one and level two nodes. A 
governing mechanism can have 656  members, while the organisations can only be 
members of 16 governing mechanisms. However, this problem is most relevant if 
measures are to be compared between networks. In this thesis it is substantively 
defensible to regard both level 1 and level 2 nodes as governing actors. In order 
emphasises this- the network is symmetrised prior to analysis so that membership is 
shown to potentially convey influence in both directions. For the Scale-free analysis of 
brokerage: governing mechanisms and humanitarian organisations are presumed to be 
ontologically equivalent as actors with a potential to exert influence on humanitarian 
governance.
4.5.3 Reach
Reach was described as the ability to extend ones reach of influence to a number of 
actors outside those with which one has direct contact. That is- the use of other node's 
ego-networks to ones own advantage. If an actor is able to motivate other actors with 
which it has direct contact, to comply with a governance initiative, then they might 
also be persuaded to advocate the initiative to the actors with which they are 
connected.  Those reached in the second degree network -can in turn persuade others 
in their networks, and so on and so forth. It is, in other words, not just how many 
organisations ego has can influence , it is also how many they in turn can influence at 
egos behest. In order to evaluate ego's reach one has to analyse egos position with 
regards to diffusion of a governance initiative. 
For the in depth analysis I will focus on the egos use of key actors in promoting 
different instruments of governance. How they can rally those with which they have 
contact, and how these in turn can aid in the spread of a governance initiative. How 
effective is the use of a relatively small ego-network of well connected nodes?  The 
data for diffusion of governance initiatives is not of a very high quality, but some 
earlier case studies to give an insight into how the concept of reach might function in 
the humanitarian network. 
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For the mathematical analysis this concept too must be formalised in a measure. 
Consider the above discussion on the role of brokerage. If power is gained by serving 
as a broker- then the use of brokers must necessarily entail less power than via direct 
contact. Assuming divergent interests, power must be a relative term. A gain in 
advantage of one node is followed by the proportionate disadvantage of another. How 
can reach then be operationalised as a source of power? Let me try to offer a solution: 
Initially any actor that can be reached, directly or otherwise, is an actor that can 
potentially be influenced. For each broker necessary to make the reach, part of the that 
potential influence is altered into a power resource for the broker. That is, for each step 
a loss of influence in the ego becomes a gain in influence by the broker. The measure 
of Reach Centrality allows for a formalisation of this loss:
RC  is a measure of the number of nodes reached by extending the ego-network by k 
steps. To reflect the loss of influence subtracted by the broker, the additional number 
of nodes reached at k degrees is divided by k. This makes sense as the maximal gain 
for the broker is 1 -if more brokers are present on the geodesic path- the value 1 is 
divided evenly among them, incurring no extra costs on ego. 
An additional question that needs to be addressed with regards to reach is direction. 
There is a distinction between a node being a member off and a node having another as 
member. Do these direction carry a substantively different meaning when considering 
reach? Will Oxfam UK have a substantively different ability to spread an initiative to 
Oxfam International compared to the vice versa? To take another example, will the 
Sphere project only spread its' standards to the Sphere-board or can the board members 
also influence the standards? As becomes obvious from these examples- influence 
through reach is bi-directional. Therefore the analysis will be conducted on a 
symmetrised dataset- as was done with brokerage. The analysis on the scale-free 
network is done with the same justification as in brokerage. With regards to scale-free 
reach: governing mechanisms and humanitarian organisations are seen as ontologically 
equivalent.
Humanitarian Governance: Network, Agency and Power
Data 47
5 Data
5.1 Sampling method
While statistical inferences can be built on randomised sampling methods from a 
population of known size, the relational nature of social network data means that 
random samples are not possible. When analysing relations between nodes, the 
observations are by definition dependent of each other- and cannot in any way be seen 
as independent observations. As discussed above, the purpose is to analyse a network 
as a complete structure, making it as much a single case as a large-n method. 
Preferably a sample in SNA should include a complete universe. . The point of 
departure is a fixed list of relevant actors, that clearly define the edges of the network 
being analysed. From there other methods, like interviews, are used to map out the ties 
between the relevant actors. For this analysis the preferred sampling method would be 
a fixed list of humanitarian organisations who respond to the question of which 
governance mechanisms they participate in.
However, for all intent and purposes the population of international humanitarian 
organisations is unknown. The figure 2,500 is the most broadly cited estimate of the 
number of operative humanitarian organisations in the world (see Juma and Suhrke 
2002; Barnett and Weiss 2008; Barnett and Weiss 2011). The original source of this 
estimate is a discontinued roster from 2003, where OCHA registered organisations 
they interacted with in the field. This list included several temporary organisations and 
local NGOs that were established at an ad hoc basis in response to a specific 
catastrophe. Barnett and Weiss (2008: 30) concludes that within the extensive list, only 
about 260 organisations can be deemed "serious actors". Neither a list of these actors, 
nor any clear specification of the term "serious actor", is provided. Another problem is 
the difficulty in contacting and soliciting response from a large number of 
organisations. Again SNA differs from statistics. While it is possible to deal with the 
problems arising from missing values in inferential statistics, missing values are not a 
resolvable issue in SNA. If the missing node should constitutes a network-broker, the 
result could be of vital importance for the analysis of the network (see Granovetter 
Humanitarian Governance: Network, Agency and Power
Data 48
1973). Each node is relevant in relation to the others, leaving a few nodes out of the 
network would therefore impact the relational attributes of all the others. In using the 
fixed-list approach, one would have to presume a 100% response rate from the 
organisations. (Doreian and Woodard 1992: 219)
My alternative approach was to use the membership lists of the governance 
mechanisms to gather the data. This means that the data was initially registered as 2-
mode data: where nodes (humanitarian organisations) are registered by the dichotomy 
participating/not participating for a series of events (global governance mechanisms). 
A consequence of this sampling approach is that there are no isolates (non-connected 
nodes) in the dataset. The criteria for node inclusion is membership in a governance 
mechanism- and as a result all registered nodes are connected to at least one event. 
While this eased some of the practical difficulties of data collection, the problem of an 
unknown population was not resolved. A complete list proved just as difficult to find 
for humanitarian governance mechanisms- as for the organisations themselves. An 
initial investigation revealed a tendency for the humanitarian governance mechanisms 
to be interconnected among themselves- in the form of membership. This makes 
possible a second-mode snowball, or chain referral, sampling method. This sampling 
methods has proven particularly useful in reaching hidden, or unknown, populations in 
sociology (c.f. Biernacki and Waldorf 1981; Penrod, Preston et al. 2003). The idea is 
that you let an initial sample of actors define the edges of the network by referring you 
to other actors they see as relevant. 
The ego-events, or initial selection of governance mechanisms, refer you to other 
relevant events in their membership lists.  As has been discussed the definition of what 
constitutes a humanitarian actor is far from over. As Slim(2003) has noted, it is the 
organisations themselves which provide the distinction between valid and invalid 
humanitarian actors. Using chain referral by membership can therefore be seen as an 
effective way of uncovering the population- as defined by the recognition of other 
humanitarian organisations. An actor is relevant in the humanitarian governance 
network, if the other actors recognise their relevance.  
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Using snowballing, as the method is most commonly referred to in the SNA literature, 
depends on as clear a definition of nodes and edges as possible. The ambition is to 
uncover an entire network, in this case the entire humanitarian governance network. 
This can be problematic. Consider the notion of “small worlds”, often popularly 
summarised as the hypothesis that any two people are connected by six degrees of 
separation (Newman 2000). In the extreme it can be presumed that following all 
expanding relational ties from  a group of people will- by the sixth repetition- include 
the entire world population. If one considers Valerie Amos, the under secretary general 
for humanitarian affairs, a relevant actor, and further believes that she discusses her 
work at home- should her daughters school friends be considered relevant in the 
humanitarian governance network? This extreme is obviously a reduction to the 
absurd, yet the core of the issue remains valid. In order to avoid a data overload, the 
network needs to be restricted. In order to capture the entirety of a network, this 
restriction cannot be arbitrary (Lauman, Marsden et al. 1992)
I chose to specify the network edges by organisational membership. Membership is 
defined as the opportunity to influence, combined with a commitment to the practices, 
values or standards of the governance mechanism (event). Members of an event, that 
themselves can be seen as an event, are included in the event list, with their 
organisational members as nodes. By organisational, I mean that the membership must 
be of a humanitarian organisation, that is an organisation that at least partially 
conducts programs to “relieve the suffering of distant strangers”(Barnett and Weiss 
2011). More specifically, they should have programs in another country than that in 
which they are registered. As an additional criteria, the governance mechanisms 
(events) need to be global, excluding national governance instruments from the 
analysis. The ego-selection of events should be as broad as possible, and the snowball 
selection should be limited by these criteria. This was my initial network boundary, 
but substantive considerations during the actual sampling have led to some 
moderations.
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5.2 Conducting the Sampling
5.2.1 Ego-event selection
The original selection was made by consulting a online database for global civil 
society governance instruments. This database was compile by One World Trust, who 
are themselves an NGO that “conducts research, develops recommendations and 
advocates for reform to make policy and decision-making processes in global 
governance more accountable” (One World Trust 2011). The database claims to be 
“the first comprehensive inventory of [...] civil society self-regulatory initiatives 
worldwide.”(One World Trust 2012). Under the category “humanitarian and 
emergency relief” fifteen instruments were listed.  
However, the list proved disorganised. Instruments of governance-  handbooks, 
standards, best practices and the likes- were seamlessly interchanged with the 
organisations that created them. Likewise, several instruments were intended for the 
exchange of information between individual people, rather than governance of entire 
organisations. The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), as an 
example, turned out be a forum for the exchange of experiences between professionals 
working with emergency education (INEE 2012). Another issue was that think-tanks 
producing accountability practices and recommendations for humanitarian relief, were 
included as governance mechanisms. Groupe URD, though initially created by MSF as 
an alternative to the formalised SPHERE-project, later evolved into an institute 
without members (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 15; URD 2012). Likewise the Humanitarian 
Practice Network (HPN) is a sub-institution of of the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI)- and primarily functions as a publisher of academic findings from the institute 
to humanitarian professionals (ODI 2012). None of theses came close to complying 
with the predefined event definition.
The organisations were filtered by my initial event selection criteria- resulting in a 
selection of eight ego-events.  (see Table 1.) However, the organisational relations 
proved more complex to describe than initially presumed. GHP, for instance, is 
primarily run by a steering committee, distinct from but including SCHR. This steering 
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committee drafts policy in between meetings which are held biennially. The outcomes 
of the broader meetings are the Principles of Partnership: a set of guidelines aimed at 
improved collaboration between UN and NGO humanitarian organisations (GHP 
2012). From a relational perspective, and definitely from a social power perspective, it 
seemed most fitting to register the two as separate events. Membership in the steering 
committee provides a greater opportunity to influence than participation in the biennial 
meetings. According to GHP (2012), the membership is largely determined by the 
participants of the first meeting in July 2007. As no other membership directory is 
provided, the participants from this meeting are registered as members of PoP (see 
GHP 2007). 
Another challenge was People in Aid, which is a borderline case between a service-
provider and a governance-mechanism. Membership can include the opportunity to 
influence- via the board of trustees. There is also an annual meeting, where the board 
is constituted- but these seem to have a low degree of participation- a quorum exists if 
10% of the members are represented . (People in Aid 2008) The primary motivation 
for organisational membership is cost-efficient human resource policies and 
guidelines. Barnett and Weiss (2011: 117) argue that a key challenge for humanitarian 
governance is professionalising the sector by keeping employees in the sector for 
longer periods of time. Human resource policies, not to mention adequate pay, are key 
to this aspect of humanitarian professionalism. There is also a perceivable collective 
action problem, as providing adequate compensation to staff, can potentially reduce 
legitimacy in the eyes of donors. It is hard to convince people to donate, if the average 
income of the humanitarian employees exceeds the average income of private donors. 
Joint governance of human resource policies could therefore be a facet of humanitarian 
governance. People in Aid (PiA) was therefore included in the analysis.
Other problems that emerged related to legal status and organisational governance. 
The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), which is a very active 
committee within humanitarian governance (see Stoddard 2003: 4), is not a registered 
legal entity (c.f. Swiss Federation 2012). The interaction between the organisations is 
through meetings between the directors of ten major humanitarian organisations. 
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While they do have a permanent secretary, working out of the IFRC offices in Geneva, 
I was unable to uncover whether the organisations divided the cost of his salary. Nor is 
it entirely clear whether the secretary represents the committee in meeting- or if this is 
divided between the member organisations directors. However, it was possible to 
confirm that meeting were held at regular intervals. (see IASC 2012) While the details 
of the inner workings of SCHR might not be readily available- it is non the less clear 
that the SCHR is an important governance mechanism. 
The other selected events were clear-cut cases, see table 1 below.
Name Coded Notes
Emergeny Capacity 
Builing Project
ECBP Organisations seeking to improve response time 
through active partnership between six major 
NGOs
Humanitarian Charter 
and Minimum 
Standards in 
Humanitarian 
Response
SPHER
E
Minimum standards are the core of the SPHERE-
project. The handbooks are used by many who are 
not among the 18 member organisations 
(Buchanan-Smith 2003)
Humanitarian 
Accountability 
Partnership
HAP Aims to improve accountability towards 
beneficiaries
Global Humanitarian 
Platform 
GHP Here membership of GHP is denoted by 
membership in the GHP steering committee. This 
committee works between broad meetings. PoP is 
the outcome of the broad meetings.
Priciples of Partnership PoP Member organisation are those participating in the 
broad biennial meetings of GHP.
Steering Committee for 
Humanitarian 
Response
SCHR Represents large NGOs in IASC.
Active Learning 
Network for 
Accountability and 
Performance in 
Humanitarian Action 
ALNAP Broad network for establishing accountabillity 
practices. State-members are not included.
People in Aid PiA Organisation for human resource policies in aid, 
membership allows influence and provides benefit 
in HR-suppport.
Tabell 1: Ego-Events
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5.2.2 Second degree referrals
Examining the membership lists quickly revealed a group of umbrella organisations 
whose membership was present in several mechanisms. The International Council of 
Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) “is a global network of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) that advocates for effective humanitarian action.”(ICVA 2012). The ambition 
of ICVA is to represent all the non-governmental humanitarian NGOs. InterAction is 
the equivalent umbrella for American NGOs, and Voice for the European. By the 
formal edge definition, InterAction should have been excluded from the analysis for 
being a national organisation. However, they are so broadly represented in governance 
mechanisms, that it seems the humanitarian community have recognised that 
American NGOs prefer to organise at a national level. Likewise, the membership of 
VOICE is limited to European NGOs- possibly as their main focus is to represent 
civil-society interests vis-a-vis the European Commission on Humanitarian aid and 
Civil Protection (see Voice 2012).This trio of umbrella organisations are broadly used 
as representatives of the entire humanitarian non-governmental sector.  GHP(2012) 
uses the term “NGOs represented by ICVA, InterAction, SCHR and VOICE.”
Another national association of NGOs which was included was Aktion Hilft- a 
German association of humanitarian agencies. They are represented solely on the 
SPHERE-board, but the members included many large international humanitarian 
NGOs registered in Germany. SPHERE is also considered one of the most influential 
arenas for humanitarian governance (see Buchanan-Smith 2003). Accurately depicting 
access to SPHERE seemed of greater importance than strictly adhering to the 
boundaries of the selection. It should also be noted that while there are only 18 
member organisations in SPHERE, 19 have been registered in the datasets. The reason 
for this is that the representative of the Lutheran World Federation- and chair of the 
board, Erik Johnson, is a director in Danish Church Aid (SPHERE 2012). Both 
organisations were listed as a member.
Another deviation from the edge definition was the inclusion of the Inter-Agency 
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Standing Committee (IASC). Membership was traced in reverse when it became clear 
that the major function of the SCHR was to represent the NGO community in IASC. 
Established as early as in 1992, the IASC's core function is to be “the primary 
mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance [...for] key UN 
and non-UN humanitarian partners” (IASC 2012). In accordance with UN resolution 
(UNGA 1992), the IASC is effectively under OCHA control and chairmanship. The 
most significant contribution from the committee to humanitarian governance has been 
the establishment of global emergency clusters. The cluster approach entails that  the 
operational responsibility for a certain area of disaster response, such as provision of 
shelter and management of camps,  falls on a pre-specified agency. (McNamara 2006: 
10) Clusters themselves have been excluded from this analysis. Beyond the cluster 
leads, other participating cluster organisations vary with different operational contexts.
The final deviant inclusion is the Humanitarian Forum (HF). Their self-stated key 
functions are: “capacity building and training; accountability; building bridges; 
coordination and cooperation; humanitarian standards.”(The Humanitarain Forum 
2012). This can certainly be seen as governing activities. The key issue is that the 
board of directors, which elects itself, have legal rights to control every aspect the 
organisations activities. The Directors are only held accountable, under UK law, to the 
mandate of the organisation. (Humanitarian Forum 2006; The Humanitarain Forum 
2012)While the relationship to the steering committee is formally subject to the board, 
they do have certain rights under the memorandum. (Humanitarian Forum 2006) This 
committee consists of some major international-western- Christian- and Islamic 
humanitarian organisations (Wahid 2012). While they do not formally control the 
organisation “their informal role- their perspectives, legitimacy and connections- are 
more important”(Shaw-Hamilton 2012). Another clear substantive issue, in favour of 
inclusion, is that the analysis so far had included very few Islamic humanitarian actors. 
The attending organisations in the steering committee where therefore registered as 
members, and HF included as an event in the analysis.  
The second degree referral eventually lead to the selection of seven additional events 
summarised in Table 2.
Humanitarian Governance: Network, Agency and Power
Data 55
Name Coding Notes
InterAction InterAction American NGO umbrella
Voice Voice European NGO umbrella
International Council of 
Voluntary Agencies
ICVA Global NGO umbrella
Action of Churches 
Together Alliance
ACT-
Alliance
Alliance of christian faith-based 
humanitarian organisations 
Aktion Hilft Aktion Hilft German NGO umbrella
Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee
IASC OCHA controlled coordination council for 
UN- Red Cross/Crescent- and non-
governmental, organisations
The Humanitarian 
Forum
HF Seeks to coordinated between Western, 
multilateral and Islamic humanitarian actors. 
Focus on local partnerships. Run by selected 
member organisations
Tabell 2: Second-degree referral
5.2.3 Third degree referrals
By the third degree referrals it seemed clear that the humanitarian governance network 
was nearing exhaustion. Following the thread of HF led to a series of national 
organisations, funded by HF, seeking to build umbrella organisations for national 
associations in beneficiary countries. While these might be a relevant part of HF's ego-
network, it is clear that the organisational members were exclusively national 
organisations. Tracing members in InterAction led to a whole series of advocacy 
alliances for US-NGOs, none of which seemed particularly relevant. A grey-zone case 
was the Alliance to End Hunger. Their activities include brokering “unique 
partnerships between [their] members [to] leverage their efforts to benefit the hungry 
people they serve” (Alliance to End Hunger 2012). However, their primary mandate is 
to build “the public and political will to end hunger at home and abroad.”(Alliance to 
End Hunger 2012). The need to specify “abroad” seems to indicate that the 
organisations primary relevance is to domestic US-policy. 
In the end, only one addition was made in the third degree referrals: the Australian 
Humanitarian Governance: Network, Agency and Power
Data 56
Council for International Development (ACFID). This too was a grey-zone 
consideration. ACFID, as is clear from its name, has a wider purpose than the purely 
humanitarian. Their ambition is to “attain a world where gross inequality and extreme 
poverty are eradicated” (ACFID 2012), which seems to fall outside the immediacy 
criteria for humanitarian relief. However, the umbrella organisation is a member of 
ICVA, which is specifically related to the humanitarian. They also hold an associated 
membership in HAP International. While many of the organisational members of 
ACFID can best be described as developmental in approach, some, like the Emergency 
Architects of Australia, have a clearly humanitarian profile. Considering the unclear 
boundaries between development and humanitarianism, and as InterAction had already 
been included, it was decided to include ACFID in the analysis. They are not 
registered as members of HAP- as associated membership is excluded form the 
analysis. The grounds for this is that their opportunity to influence is limited.
5.2.4 Concluding note on sampling
The intention behind sampling in SNA is to uncover a complete network: "the 
presumption is that such a network exists and the data collection task is to obtain a 
veridical image of it"(Doreian and Woodard 1992: 216). While an attempt was made at 
delineating the network boundaries in advance of sampling, the actual network did not 
fit the presumed qualities. When reality and theoretical presuppositions come in 
conflict, I find it safer to err on the side of reality. By choosing to stretch the criteria of 
inclusion- the selection process has become slightly more arbitrary. I can no longer 
claim to have uncovered a complete social network given the specified edge definition. 
However, the sampled network does fit better with the governance network as it is 
presented in the literature (see Macrae and Harmer 2003; Stoddard 2003; Borton 
2009). The sacrifice of the the clear delineation of a social network was made to come 
closer to the ideal of the humanitarian governance network. 
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6 Analysis Part- 1 The humanitarian governance 
network.
The diagram below is a depiction of the network as a whole. How well does the 
structure correspond to the theory? The first impression is that there are several nodes 
connected only to a singular event. Another impression is that there seems to be a core 
of organisations in the centre- intertwined in a complex web of relations, while the 
periphery is primarily consists of loosely connected nodes. The image does bring to 
mind Kropotkin's (1910) description of “the complex web of voluntary associations 
would represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and 
federations.” But how well does it reflect the assumptions made in the theory? Is this a 
non-hierarchical hierarchy? Do the organisations choose membership in a sufficiently 
varied manner to indicate a complex combination of diverging interests?  In this first 
part of the analysis I investigate the questions of hierarchy and membership 
constellations to see if the network below fits the assumptions from the theory.
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6.1 Divergent interests and unique constellations
Calculating the number of unique constellations in the network in UCINET (Borgatti, 
Everett et al. 2002) gives us the number of unique combinations of membership for 
organisations as 87. Of these a substantial number of organisations are only members 
of a single event. ActionAid has 148 members otherwise unconnected to the network, 
the Act-Alliance has 98,  VOICE has 96, and  ACFID 54. All the other governing 
mechanisms, with the exception of SCHR, IASC, ECBP,  have some otherwise 
unconnected nodes. The Table 3. below summarises the most frequent membership 
combinations for more than two organisations: 
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Combination Frequency
PiA, ICVA 16
PiA, ACFID 10
PiA, VOICE, HAP 5
IASC, ICVA 5
PiA, IASC 4
ALNAP, PoP, VOICE, 4
HAP, ICVA 4
PiA, ICVA 4
Tabell 3: Membership Combinations
In addition to other combinations with frequencies below four, there are 53 unique 
constellations of membership represented in the dataset. Assuming that all 
organisations are aware of the other initiatives, and further assuming that they are 
openly allowed to join all mechanisms7, this would indicate the existence of 53 unique 
sets of interests with regards to humanitarian governance. 
In the theory chapter it was assumed that the number of unique constellations would at 
least exceed 32- which the measured data does. However, the large number of 
organisations tied to a single governing mechanism- and the clear dominance of 
regional consortia, might indicate that the most relevant cleavages are regional. 
Another implication of this is that the humanitarian transnational anarchy might be 
more hierarchical than initially presumed. Perhaps the regional consortia function as 
representatives of the larger fauna in governing mechanisms- thereby making a 
hierarchical logic more applicable to studying humanitarian governance. None the less 
I find the criteria specified in hypothesis 1 sufficiently satisfied. 
6.2 Non-Hierarchical hierarchy
In table 4 below the indicators of the ideal hierarchy are summarised for the network 
of organisations being members of more than one governing mechanism, more than 
three governing mechanisms, and for the network between the governing mechanisms 
themselves. The measures are a lot higher than I had anticipated. The network with of 
7 Which would be a faulty assumption. See Data Sampling chapter.
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organisations with a degree above one, is only slightly divergent from the ideal form 
of the perfect hierarchy. However, the connectedness measure is an automorphism of 
the snowball sampling method. As governing mechanisms were uncovered by 
referrals- it is only logical that the network should be perfectly connected. The 
disconnectedness of the inter-governance mechanism network is a consequence of 
unconnected node in the ego-event selection. Likewise, hierarchy is the measure of the 
proportion of symmetrical ties. Reciprocal membership would come close to being a 
contradiction in terms, in the network the only reciprocal tie is that between the 
General Humanitarian Platform and the Principles of partnership. 
Scale-free network Degree above 1 Degree above 3 Governing 
Mechanisms
Connectedness 1.0000 1.0000 0.7583
Hierarchy  0.9994 0.9973 0.9697
Efficiency  0.9829 0.8831 0.8718
LUB 0.9829 0.9344 0.6282
NB: The GTD Krackhardt calculation was attempted applied to the entire scale free-network. However, the  
algorithm proved too heavy to apply to such a large dataset (see Appendix A), and the results produced were  
clearly erroneous. This measure was therefore not included.
Tabell 4: Hierarchy towards the centre
However, efficiency, that is the extent to which organisations are organised as 
responding to a single governing entity,  does carry substantive meaning in this case. 
Presumably  high membership in regional consortia have had their influence on the 
lower levels. The measure does decrease substantially as the network is reduced 
towards the core, indicating that the efficiency of the network drops towards higher 
levels of governance. Finally the Least Upper Bound is a measure of the extent to 
which all actors in the network could possibly answer to the same ego-node. The high 
value of this measure is not produced by a logical leading mechanism- such as 
OCHA's Inter-Agency-Standing Committee- but is rather the a consequence of the 
complex interconnections between governance mechanisms. Sphere has InterAction 
and ICVA as members, in addition to the Act-Alliance. This membership is conferred 
to ALNAP by their membership there. Likewise HAP has ACFID and VOICE as 
members, they are also members of ALNAP. So ALNAP is at the end of the line for 
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all the major consortia, and includes most major organisations in the network. They 
are therefore the least upper bound and capture 98% of the network in their potentially 
hierarchical position.  However, as the network is limited towards more central actors- 
this position is decreased and the possible least upper bound is reduced to 63% in the 
inter-mechanism network.
While the degree of hierarchy is high, it is hard to estimate precisely how high. While 
some scholars have attempted to describe a bell-curve of the distribution of hierarchy 
in random networks, it has been found that the factors influencing hierarchy are many 
(see Brigham, Butts et al. 1999). Should the results be corrected for network density? 
Should it be corrected for the number of nodes? In effect, the network hierarchy in 
humanitarian governance can only be an absolute measure compared to the random 
distribution of hierarchy in humanitarian governance networks. As there is only one 
such network- this is not an option.
Suffice to say that the structure does fit the assumptions of the model. The hierarchy 
measured here is not qualitative, but only captures the existence of a possible 
hierarchy. The initially hierarchical nature of the network decreases as one approaches 
the core.  Among the governing mechanisms there is no plausible way in which an 
effective hierarchy could even potentially exist. In short, I find the criteria specified in 
hypothesis 2 and 3 sufficiently fulfilled.
7 Analysis Part-2: Humanitarian Agency
The diagrams used in the qualitative analysis limit number of nodes by only including 
organisations with membership in two or more higher level entities. This was a 
necessity brought on by limitations to the number of nodes which could be included 
with labels. Qualitative explorations and diagrams are produced in Netdraw (Borgatti 
2002).
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7.1 DHA/OCHA: With a License To Govern
7.1.1 DHAs Initial Power Capital
OCHA was established in 1992 under as a consequence of the recommendations in 
UN General Assembly resolution . The ambitions on behalf of the newly established 
"high-level official" were enormous. On behalf of the Sectary General, the 
humanitarian affairs official was to coordinate the UN agencies and NGOs at a central 
level, as well as oversea and coordinate between NGOs, UN-agencies, and "all all 
locally or regionally available relief capacities". This was to be done in a manner 
which ensured a "speedy transition from relief to development". (UNGA 1992) The 
DHA was, essentially, tasked with resolving all the issues of lacking governance of the 
sector as they were perceived in 1991-2 (Tsui and Myint-U 2004). Considering the 
daunting nature of their task, the DHA were given precious few power resources. 
Consider the available power capital for the DHA in 1992: When the "high-ranking 
official" had been established as the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)- the 
position was placed at the level of Under-secretary-general- the same rank provided 
for the heads of the UN humanitarian agencies.8 In other words, the ERC did not 
outrank any of the UN agency heads. This was in terms of formal rank. Informally, the 
UNDP Under-secretary-general  is considered the third most powerful within the UN-
system, as the position controls the largest budget. DHA's mandate to coordinate did 
not seem to require a large budget. Some limited field presence in to coordinate 
nationaly, and offices in New York and Geneva, require little funding compared to the 
the giants like WFP, UNDP, and UNHCR. As a consequence, the ERC was actually 
asked to coordinate the efforts of other under secretary generals with formal equivalent 
ranks, yet who out-ranked him9 informally. (see Natsios 1995)
Vis-a-vis the NGOs, DHA had vague mandate to serve "as a central focal point" 
between them and the relevant governments and IGOs. Another source of potential 
8 High Commisioners, and other leaders of specialised agencies, hold the equivalent rank of Under-secretary-
general in the UN-system (UN Secretary General 1997)
9 Jan Kenneth Eliasson: ERC from 1992-1994
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influence was via the IASC. The standing committee was intended to serve as a 
coordination mechanism between all humanitarian NGOs and IGOs, and was 
specifically placed under the chairmanship of the ERC. Beyond chairmanship, the 
ERC was given no formal powers. The ERC was to excert influence "through 
consultations" in the capacity as chair of IASC. (UNGA 1992) While the promised 
"Consolidated Appeals Process" (UNGA 1992) did hold some potential leverage over 
funding, it was never effectively utilised- and never became a real power source for 
DHA.  When you add the factors of limited field presence, no formal power, very 
limited funding, and relatively under-qualified staff (Weiss 1998), it is a small wonder 
that the DHA "made little practical difference in humanitarian crises" (Sending and 
Stensland 2011: 13). 
7.1.2 DHA post-Rwanda: Entering the game of humanitarian 
governance
The JEEAR report- which became the major driving force behind humanitarian 
governance, did not involve DHA before very late in the process. Initiated and chaired 
by the Danish Development Agency (Danida) the JEEAR Steering Committee 
included DHA, en-par with other UN-agencies, among 38 state, NGO, and IGO stake-
holders. (Borton 2004) Nor did the findings give DHA any voice of authority. During 
the Rwanda crisis, an ad hoc coordination organ, UN Rwanda Emergency Response 
Office (UNREO), had been established as a joint endevour between UNDP and DHA. 
This created much confusion on the ground as DHA and UNREO both perceived it as 
their task to coordinate. (ODI 1996: 19) Nor had DHA fulfilled any of its' obligations 
to aid in coordination of the NGO community. In the end the NGO coordination office 
was instigated, not by DHA, but by ICVA. (von Bernuth 1996). To summarise the 
findings of JEEAR with regards to DHA: the organisation would only be ably to fulfil 
its' function if it became better staffed, better funded, and was given more control 
external funding and greater authority over the other UN-agencies (ODI 1996)
In the years after JEEAR, the DHA focused its activities on trying to establish 
authority vis-a-vis other UN-agencies. The activities centred around identifying 
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"protection gaps" where groups like the internally displaced (IDPs) fell outside of any 
clear agency protection mandate.(McNamara 2006: 1-2) The operative UN-agencies 
were as active on the "humanitarian market place"(Smilie and Minear 2004) as other 
organisations- and so the DHA also focused its' efforts on trying to make CAP work. 
While the NGO community was establishing new governance mechanisms -and 
expanding others- DHA was primarily preoccupied by inter-UN debates. (Kent 2004) 
And so the DHA remained at the outskirts of the governance network. 
While the DHA might have had a hard time asserting authority within the UN system, 
it soon became apparent that the NGO community could no longer be ignored. 
Attempts at establishing a steering committee for the IASC, were hampered by DHA's 
demand that there only be one representative of the non-governmental community. 
DHA tried to force the issue, but in the end had to report its' inability to establish a 
steering committee “owing to the strong opposition of the agencies not included in the 
proposed list of members” (ECOSOC 2000)10.  In 1998 the internal oversights 
committee demanded that DHA pay more attention to the external developments 
within humanitarian governance. In a somewhat crass manner it was indicated that the 
DHA should endeavour for “a minimum of coordination with other initiatives.” They 
also made it clear that DHA should pursue “the adoption of guidelines and standards, 
within the framework of the non-governmental organizations outside the UN system.” 
(UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 1998) The DHA responded in its' report to 
ECOSOC, that they had participated in the Sphere-project (ECOSOC 2000). This was 
a slight exaggeration- they had only had two meeting with the initiators, which 
remained their sole contribution to the project (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 32-33). None 
the less, DHA recommended broad implementation of the Sphere standards throughout 
the UN humanitarian system. In short, the UN mandated governors of 
humanitarianism found themselves in a position where they were increasingly being 
governed by a community they knew little about. Humanitarian governance was 
growing- and DHA had been side-lined. Their attempts at asserting authority through 
10 While the report to ECOSOC was made in 2000- two years after DHA had become OCHA- it was still the 
Secretary general  reporting on DHA activities- written by DHA employees. Such are the intricacies of the 
UN bureaucracy.
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their mandate had failed- something needed to be done.  
In 1998 DHA was reorganised into OCHA. This was not a reorganisation aimed 
specifically at improving relations with the NGO community. However, it can be 
noted that while DHA had only spoken sporadically of “representatives of the non-
governmental community”(c.f. ECOSOC 1997; ECOSOC 2000)11,  OCHA clearly 
listed InterAction, ICVA, and SCHR as members of IASC in their annual reports (c.f. 
OCHA 1999; OCHA 2001). It had become evident that if OCHA was to establish 
itself in coordinating function- it needed to rally support outside the confines of the 
UN-system. Under Jan Egeland, OCHA seemed to realise the potential for governance 
through the network connections of a few central organisations. That is, making use of 
the social capital of the other humanitarian organisations who were eager for greater 
participation within a UN-framework. In 2004 OCHA ordered a report that would 
investigate possibilities for broader sector wide coordination. A key finding of this 
report was that:
 “The three international humanitarian networks examined (UN,Red Cross/Red  
Crescent Movement and NGOs), as well as the IOM, remain vertical to each other  
within each network and collaboration between the networks needs to be  
considerably improved.”
(Adinolfi, Bassiouni et al. 2005: 9)
So when OCHA began the work on the cluster-approach, it made a greater use of the 
NGO-community than before.  The cluster-approach entails a that an agency is given 
mandate to coordinate, and responsibility to oversee, the service delivery within one area of 
humanitarian relief. This system is dependent on a broad acceptance of the cluster-leads role 
among all humanitarian organisations. In order to ensure NGO support for the approach, 
OCHA instigated the General Humanitarian Platform, where several major NGOs 
participated- and OCHA was the only UN-agency. This project culminated in the the 
Principles of Partnership in 2007, where 36 NGOs pledged their support to the principles. 
Among the principles was a commitment to the equality of the actors and a  “mutual respect 
between members of the partnership irrespective of size and power.”(Global Humanitarian 
11 The Secretary General makes the report to ECOSOC on behalf of the DHA.
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Platform 2007) 
Prior to the GHP and the principles of partnership there had been some initial skepticism 
towards the cluster-approach. It was considered a UN-centric empty reform. However, by the 
end of 2007 this scepticism had been greatly alleviated (Steets, Grünewald et al. 2010: 71). 
NGOs and UN-agencies where cooperating better and there was a widespread acceptance for 
the cluster framework. In august 2011 the cluster approach was used in 44 different countries 
with UN-emergency personnel present (OneResponse 2012). The latest evaluation report 
concludes that  "the benefits generated by the cluster approach to date already slightly 
outweigh its costs and shortcomings"(Steets, Grünewald et al. 2010: 74)- which is high praise 
in a humanitarian evaluation. How can we explain this success? 
Consider the diagram below. This is OCHAs so-called ego-network within the scale-
free dataset. It is a representations of the nodes with which OCHA has direct contact 
(membership).
Now this is not a very impressive network. The scale free representation does rob us of 
the other members of IASC, which might have given a fuller picture. None the less- 
the point is that OCHA alone has a somewhat meagre network. 
Now let us conduct a thought-experiment. Lets say that the cluster idea was sold to the 
other participants. The core UN-agencies and IFRC were offered cluster leads- 
securing their support. What did the NGO-community get? The members of GHP- the 
steering committee for the Principles of Partnership- certainly had a stake in the 
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outcome. Being included en-par with OCHA  in the move to sell the cluster-approach 
to the broader NGO-community gave- them a vested interest in the outcome. The 
signatories of the Principles of Partnership had in essence been invited to a broad 
discussion, and an agreement had been reaches committing them to the cluster-
approach. So let us include the PoP signatories, the IASC members, and the GHP 
members in OCHA's cluster-approach network. The diagram below gives a depiction 
of this extended ego-network:
This extended ego-network consists of 40 nodes of the 202 in the core network. 
Roughly 20 % of the core community where now engaged- fairly directly- in the 
implementation of the cluster-approach. OCHA's ability to successfully implement the 
cluster-approach is dramatically improved. 
Now let us extend this thought with regards to the Steering Committee for 
Humanitarian Response (SCHR). This committee was established already in 1972 and 
in 2007 included ten major humanitarian actors (IASC 2012). Unlike the broad 
umbrella organisations like InterAction, Voice and ICVA, membership in SCHR is 
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limited. The advantage of this small committee is that the members are more actively 
engaged in the work done on their behalf. The committee plays a central role in the 
IASC, and was a crucial component of the GHP steering committee.  While the broad 
umbrella organisations might not be able to convince all their members to support an 
initiative, the participation of the SCHR entails the full support of each organisation. 
The limited size of the committee allows them to communicate between each other on 
a regular basis. SCHR was given a central role in the promotion of the Principles of 
Partnership- and in the marketing of the cluster-approach. The level of their inclusion 
makes it plausible to assume that the cluster-approach gained support from the ten 
humanitarian organisations in SCHR. This has a major impact on the cluster-approach 
network. Including the ego-networks of the SCHR members extends OCHAs cluster-
approach network even further:
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The SCHR ego-network, including the committees membership in the IASC and GHP, 
have been marked in red. If the organisational members of SCHR actively promoted 
the cluster-approach 112 nodes would be reached in the cluster-approach network. 
This means that more than a half of the central network is directly covered. It should 
be noted that this is in the scale-free network, which means that ties between 
organisations through shared membership have not been registered. The registered 
ego-networks for SCHR-members are only first degree neighbourhoods. If, for 
example, Oxfam where to exert its influence in an ALNAP-meeting- encouraging 
support for the cluster-initiative from other ALNAP-members- this would mean a 
second degree  neighbourhood.  The second degree neighbourhood- in this case- 
includes 201 nodes, only two nodes short of the entire central network.
To conclude this somewhat technical discussion: the reason OCHA had a relative 
success with the cluster-approach is that they were able to effectively utilise the 
connections of the other parties. By actively including organisations- they gave them a 
stake in the outcome. This enable OCHA to utilise their ego-networks in addition to its 
own, allowing for the broader diffusion of humanitarian governance through the 
cluster-approach. This increased OCHA ability to exert a governing influence over the 
network as a whole. However, it should be noted that the other organisations, perhaps 
especially the members of SCHR, now acted as network-brokers on behalf of OCHA. 
OCHA's power- in this case- was dependent upon their support.
7.2 MSF: Anti-authoritarianism and governance
7.2.1 MSF's initial power resources
MSF was established in 1971 by a group of Red Cross doctors outraged by the Red 
Cross's apparent complacency in the face of the genocide committed by the Nigerian 
army during the Biafra conflict. As has been discussed, this break between the French 
doctors and the Red Cross, has come to epitomise the cleavage between classicist and 
and solidarist humanitarians. While in principle founded on the idea of neutrality to 
gain access, the concept of témoignage (bearing witness) left them in a position were 
they combined operative humanitarianism with human rights advocacy. The idea of 
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neutrality was stretched to its limits. MSF frequently chose to actively support one side 
of a conflict – and the staff was given ample opportunity to use the organisation as an 
outlet for their natural political inclinations. Paul Berman (cited inBarnett 2009: 650) 
has joked that the MSF is "a sort of medical wing to the world guerilla movement." In 
addition to being a bit of a rebel against the humanitarian establishment, MSF also 
proudly opposed states interference in their programs. They believed that actively 
distancing themselves from state donors would allow then to "speak truth to power, 
gain access to those in need, and maintain credibility and legitimacy" (Barnett 2009: 
650). 
(Barnett 2009: 648-50)
MSFs initial power is a bit hard to characterise. A part of it is the sheer size of the 
organisation. By 1994 MSF already had four associated national organisation and had 
been operational in most of the worlds humanitarian hotspots since 1983 (MSF 2012). 
Additionally, MSF were among the first organisations to actively embrace a move 
towards professionalism. Among the first manifestations of the "new 
humanitarianism" (Barnett and Weiss 2011: 89-104) was MSF's turbulent 
reorganisation in 1979- eventually leading to a split and the creation of Medecines de 
Monde (MSF 2012).  The disagreement that led to the split was whether to prioritise 
témoignage and public relations- or to focus the efficiency, speed and quality of relief 
delivery. MSF chose a move towards professionalism, whereas Medecines de Monde 
(MdM) chose to oppose the "bureaucrats of misery" and continue their work based on 
the founding principles (Barnett 2009: 650). In terms of both principles and practice, 
MSF had been a pioneer within the humanitarian field, granting them a somewhat 
unique legitimacy in the humanitarian community. While a bit hard to categorise- this 
is undoubtedly a power resource.
7.2.2 MSF post-Rwanda: unscathed and unchanged
MSF emerged relatively unscathed from the scandalous engagement in Rwanda. 
Unlike the majority of its' peers, MSF had understood the full extent of the genocide 
and acted accordingly. While Oxfam and the majority of the humanitarian community 
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made repeated calls for cease-fire, MSF ”called for a military intervention and took out 
a full page ad in Le Monde that declared, You cannot stop genocide with doctors” 
(Barnett 2009: 651). Eventually MSF “[p]rotesting at the lack of security and the 
questionable morality of assisting those involved in the genocide, who were now 
regrouping to continue their struggle, MSF-France withdrew its personnel” (ODI 
1996: 45). While controversial at the time (see ODI 1996: 57), MSF's decision to 
withdraw from the field  has later been applauded (see eg. DeWaal 1997: 193-7). The 
JEEAR report, which became a harsh blow for the humanitarian community, left MSF 
fairly unscathed. When mentioned, MSF is primarily applauded for their ability to 
access difficult areas and their foresighted solution to difficult problems (see eg. ODI 
1996: 11, 33, 39, 88, 129).
MSF's first involvement in the post-Rwandan governance network was via the Sphere-
project. Sphere was born at a meeting instigated by SCHR and attended by all the 
major humanitarian umbrella organisations, ICVA, InterAction,  VOICE, and the 
ACT-alliance. Among the few individual NGOs invited were the members of SCHR, 
including MSF. (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 19) MSF were willing to participate as they 
“initially perceived Sphere to be a relatively low-key exercise to share technical 
guidelines and policies between different operational agencies” (Buchanan-Smith 
2003: 23). However, when it became clear that Sphere had broader ambitions- seeking 
to establish shared standards of delivery for the entire humanitarian field, MSF became 
more sceptical. Already in 1998 it became clear that the direction the Sphere project 
was heading in might weaken the legitimacy of MSFs modus operandi. In the closing 
ceremony of the Sphere project made Dr Orbinski, the MSF president made his 
misgivings known:
"As an association rooted in civil society, MSF considers itself open and  
accountable primarily to civil society. Its legitimate authority is therefore  
informal, and this has its locus relative to the formal legitimacy of state  
structures and the political nation state system and their formal responsibilities  
in international law and international humanitarian law. It is in this informal  
legitimacy where we wish to remain to sometimes engage in a kind of dialectic  
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relationship with formally state structures around humanitarian action. [original 
emphasis] (Orbinski 1998)
MSF sought to encourage a new direction, emphasising  that technical standards in 
themselves only served as tools for formal actors such as states. Humanitarianism, as 
Orbinski (1998) kept repeating, was more than standards and regulations. Orbinski's 
speech was a discrete warning, a shot of the bow, to indicate that the project was 
moving in a direction MSF could not follow. It was even hinted that the concerns 
"were not necessarily unique to MSF."
These concerns were later made a reality. In a closed letter to the board- MSF warned 
of their imminent withdrawal from the project. Attempts were made at reconciliation 
and for a short period of time the Sphere-project was in doubts as to how they should 
proceed: "Should the launch go ahead as planned? How could MSF and other 
significant humanitarian agencies be kept on board? But eventually the decision was 
taken to go ahead." (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 15-16). Why was it so easy for Sphere to 
let MSF go? The diagram below illustrates MSF's position vis-a-vis Sphere. While the 
entire ego-network of MSF has been include- Spheres ego-network is only to the first 
degree.
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The sphere-project was at the centre of the humanitarian governance network. They 
had all manner of organisations in their board- from faith-based, such as Lutheran 
World Federation, to classicist, such as the IFRC, and Wilsonians, such as Care 
International. Nor did the Sphere-project need MSF's contacts via the SHCR- as the 
other members of the committee were well represented. So there is no wonder that the 
threat from MSF -in this context- did not bare fruit. However, in an informal capacity, 
that is outside of formal memberships, MSF had a slightly greater reach. 
Prior to withdrawal from the Sphere-project MSF and three other organisations, Action 
Contra la Faime (ACF), Medecines de Monde (MdM) and Indicateur de 
Développement Humain (IDH) had begun to organise through an association they 
called Groupe URD. They hoped to be able to accomplish an alternative form of 
humanitarian governance that could compete with Sphere. This work finally 
culminated in a conference to establish the Quality Project. The introduction to the 
conference proceedings for the Project Quality leave little doubt as to their purpose:
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From 1998 to 2000, a number of NGOs joined forces, through the Quality platform,  
to stand against the standardisation process that was being implemented in the  
humanitarian sector. The platform was then challenged, at the end of 1999, with the  
question: "and what do you propose?". The basis of the Quality Project was thus  
established.  (Quality Project 2002)
While definitely dominated by French NGOs, Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation 
in Emergencies (Voice) were also present. ALNAP and MdM were intended 
participants, but did not send any delegates. (see Quality Project 2002) While the 
initiative certainly hoped to provide an alternative to Sphere, it never really took off. 
Today the Quality Project has evolved into COMPAS Qualité - a resource centre 
without any member organisations, or any solid reach into the humanitarian field. 
They publish handbooks and tool-kits, as the Sphere-project does, but these are 
scholarly publications rather than joint standards.  (see COMPAS Qualité 2012)
MSF was at the forefront of the anti-Sphere movement within the humanitarian field, 
but never managed to produce a viable alternative. It is an interesting detail the MdM 
seemed to loose interest in the Quality Project. While MSF and MdM split because 
MSF chose to move in the direction of standardised practice, MdM did not seem to 
want to follow MSF in making a "stand against the standardisation process". An 
interesting by-note is that while MdM, who did not have a stake in the General 
Humanitarian Platform (GHP), participated in the Principles of Partnership (PoP)- the 
MSF, who had a stake via the SCHR, did not. Taking a closer look at the ego-networks 
of these two organisations shows how opposing their approach to humanitarian 
governance is:
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While MSF has withdrawn to a voluntary exile with regards to humanitarian 
governance , MdM seems to have actively pursued influence. The central 
organisations of MdM is a member of both ICVA and Voice. Additionally, MdMs 
national associations are separately registered in VOICE- effectively giving MdM 5 
votes, out of a total of 82 member organisations, in VOICE. The paradox here is that 
despite the split between the two organisations, MdM was first willing to follow MSF 
out of Sphere, then seems to have decided to move towards a broader approach. While 
the move out Sphere demonstrated MSFs influence over several French NGOs, it 
might have cost them support when they proved unable to provide a viable alternative.
7.3 Care International: Network Adaptation
7.3.1 Initial Power-resources
CARE has become such a known brand that it's original long form, Cooperative for 
American Remittances to Europe, has long been in disuse. None the less, this heritage 
was important for how the organisation entered the network of humanitarian 
governance. Initially their primary objective was food aid delivery. They were the 
intermediary from the US government to a war torn Europe- and a vital instrument of 
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the Marshal Plan. Their continued growth after Europe's recovery can largely be 
attributed to the good-will of the American government. Having been instigated as a 
semi-governmental operation- they did not shy away from promoting state interests. 
Maintaining their identity as non-governmental humanitarians, CARE still openly 
"claimed that it furthered US national interests even if it was not its instrument" 
(Barnett 2009: 641). This meant that their impartiality and neutrality were 
questionable- but the sheer size of the organisation still made them a major 
humanitarian actor. (Barnett 2009: 640-2) Beyond size, they also had an operational 
legitimacy, and their highly qualified staff- and active use of specialists- made them 
respected actors on the ground (see eg. ODI 1996: 39,103). CARE had a background 
which made them especially  well equipped for major logistical operations and the 
technical aspects of efficient aid delivery. In the words of Barnett (2009: 641) "they 
prided themselves on their managerial expertise." 
7.3.2 Care post Rwanda: 
Care was as exposed as its' peers to the harsh criticisms presented in JEEAR. CARES 
first move into the humanitarian governance network was joining SCHR in 1996 
(Henry 1999). They entered just in time to be part of SCHR new found focus on rights. 
From early in the year SCHR had circulated memos with regards to a proposed "set of 
technical standards in four sectors, based on the rights of those affected" (Buchanan-
Smith 2003: 31). This was the first systematic advent of the rights based approach12. 
Already in November 1996 CARE, which up to that point had been fairly agnostic 
with regards to rights, start an internal examination of the relationship between their 
activities and human rights. The interesting aspect of this is that CARE did so in full 
understanding of the consequences it would have for their relationship with the US-
government.  (Barnett 2009: 643) Just as MSF had to avoid formal standards to be free 
to act politically, CARE needed the freedom to act as the food aid representative of the 
US-government. To be bound by the rights-based approach and set standards- was to 
potentially break the very lucrative tie to the United States. 
12 The first beginings of the righst based approache within a humanitarian governance context. More broadely 
varieties of rights based approaches have existed since the 1950's. For a full discussion see Cornwall and 
Nyamu-Musembi 2004.
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Now Barnett (Barnett 2009: 654) finds CARE to be a deviant case with regards to his 
evolutionary model for humanitarian agencies; proving that "aid agencies can walk 
away from the hand that feeds them if they are convinced that their feeding is taking 
food out of the mouths of the needy." He accredits CARE's move towards a rights 
based approach to historical happen-stance: the combination of an internal discussion, 
"considerable reflections regarding the shortcomings of the field" and the rise of a new 
president of CARE. The importance of Peter Bell's presidency in CARE is that he was 
a former chair of what would later become the Human Rights Watch. (Barnett 2009: 
642) However, the reflections on the short-coming in the field had begun before Bell's 
presidency began in 1995. Already from April to July in 1994- the broad-based 
discussions on failures in Rwanda had begun among actors in the humanitarian field 
(Buchanan-Smith 2003). There is a reason Bell was elected President- and they need 
not be irrational or tied to a higher ethic.
Prior to Rwanda CARE had been the very definition of a Wilsonian humanitarian 
organisation. They had a broad technical expertise, but for the Dunantist organisations 
they could not be viewed as a legitimate actor- not while being so closely tied to 
American foreign policy. The advent of humanitarian governance presented a unique 
opportunity for CARE, whose technical and managerial expertise could potentially 
provide an opportunity to influence the sector as a whole. If they were to have any 
chance in achieving this, outside a purely American context, they needed to cut the tie 
to the US-government. They needed to find an independent principled formulation that 
could increase the value of their technical abilities. The chair of CARE, Lincoln C. 
Chen, summarised their position at the time that Bell took over the presidency:
When Peter Bell joined CARE as president and CEO in 1995, he took the helm of  
an organization with 50 years’ experience relieving suffering around the world.  
We excelled at managing complex logistical systems during emergencies and at  
meeting the dire needs of people in extremely poor communities. Yet, by the time  
of Peter’s arrival, it had become increasingly clear that we, like other  
international development agencies, needed to do more. We needed to transform  
ourselves into positive forces for sustainable change in an ever more complex  
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world. (Chen 2006: 1)
By turning to a rights based approach, CARE made themselves compatible with 
Dunantist and Solidarists, with the notable exception of MSF and some other the 
francophone NGOs. Their managerial and technical expertise became an important 
power-resource when establishing joint standards and practices. The governing 
initiatives produced became easy practices for CARE to adapt- and further increased 
their legitimacy in the humanitarian field.
After joining SCHR in 1996, CARE's engagement in the humanitarian governance 
network took off. They joined People in Aid at the same time as they started 
participation in the development of the Sphere project later in 1996. They were among 
the first members of ALNAP which was established in 1997 (Stein 2009: 152). CARE 
also initiated the Emergency Response Capacity Building Project (ECBP), through 
which six of the largest humanitarian INGOs sought to collaborate to improve their 
response time. When the Humanitarian Accountability Project was established in 
2003, CARE was among the few American organisations who let HAP conduct a base-
line analysis of their organisation (see HAP 2012).
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In initiating the ECBP, CARE made use of their brokerage position. Being the 
“quintessential Wilsonian” (Macrae and Harmer 2003: 33) organisation gave them 
legitimacy vis-a-vis the American NGOs, while their new rights-based approach and 
technical acumen gave them legitimacy vis-a-vis the Europeans.
The membership in HAP is a bit more confusing, as the top to bottom accountability 
scheme offered by HAP is not entirely well suited for CARE's practices. CARE's 
accountability practice is rights based and promotes minimum standards and 
frameworks, but CARE does not have a tradition for beneficiary accountability. The 
idea of beneficiary accountability breaks with the Wilsonian idea of humanitarianism 
as a non-problematic doing of good deeds. HAP's rather strict definitions of what 
constitutes accountability has therefore been received with ambivalence from several 
Wilsonian NGOs. While some "argue that they fear adding a new, cumbersome layer 
of bureaucracy to already overstretched field offices. Others admit that the HAP raises 
the spectre of potential litigation- that particularly American scourge." (Macrae and 
Harmer 2003: 33) While the results of the base-line analysis is confidential (see HAP 
2011: 9) it is likely that CARE would have fallen somewhat short of the mark. This 
explains why they are not certified members of HAP- but does not explain why they 
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remain paying members. It seems that CARE pursues an active policy of participation, 
even when initiatives fall outside their comfort zones. Unlike MSF, which feared the 
impact minimum standards- and therefore withdrew to a voluntary exile.
7.4 OFADEC: Punching above one's weight
7.4.1 OFADEC's initial power resources
Office Africain pour le Developpement et la Cooperation (OFADEC) was established 
in 1976 as a local initiative responding to a severe drought situation. The first project 
was a small one- focusing on one small village on the banks of the Gambia river. After 
an initial success they secured external funding from the US organisation UMCOR, 
the humanitarian branch of the Methodist Church (UMCOR 2012). This increased 
funding allowed them to expand their activities into developing irrigation systems. By 
the end of the program they had produced irrigation systems in 20 villages, impacting 
the lives of approximately 2000 people. (OFADEC 2012) Compared to the large 
humanitarian enterprises conducted by the major transnational NGOs, this is relatively 
small scale. In the context of transnational humanitarian governance they were a small 
national NGO operating in Senegal.
The Senegal-Mauritania Border conflict of 1989-1991 changed this situation. The 
armed conflict between the two states was of a limited nature, but the ethnic conflict 
between the Moors and the black Africans in the area led to the forced exodus of 70 
000 southern Mauritanians into Senegal. This emergency situation prompted the 
involvement of the UNHCR.  While OFADEC was initially only involved in food 
distribution for the UNHCR, they gradually proved the advantages of their local 
knowledge- and eventually became a full implementing partner. Towards the end of 
1992 they had effectively taken over the whole operative aspect of UNHCR 
engagement with Mauritanian refugees. (Fresia 2009: 285-9)
While not a very big humanitarian organisation, OFADEC still had legitimacy as an 
African national NGO which had not only successfully implemented projects to 
improve living conditions in Senegal,  they had also proved themselves a very 
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successful implementing partner for the UN. This is one of those instances were size 
does not really matter- they were legitimate because they operated complex 
humanitarian programs and mastered the strict reporting criteria for implementing 
partners of the UN.  
7.4.2 OFADEC post Rwanda
The events in Rwanda bore no direct relevance for OFADEC. They had not been 
present and held no responsibility for the humanitarian failures in Rwanda. Yet 
JEEAR would still have an impact on the future of OFADEC. JEEAR found a 
shocking lack of understanding for local culture and structures among the aid-workers. 
Lack of understanding and cultural acumen often lead to difficult and at times 
dangerous situations. The lack of language competency outside of French, ment that 
several of the more vulnerable members of the refugee populations were unable to 
communicate their concern- effectively maintaining a hierarchy where the educated 
French speaking elite dominated the the vulnerable Kinyarwanda speakers.(see ODI 
1996: 175-78) How was the international humanitarian community to overcome these 
challenges? While not part of the JEEAR recommendations, it became clear that local 
partnerships were needed. Collaboration with local NGOs and civil society could 
provide the international humanitarians with the local insight they needed. An 
additional advantage would be that the local emergency capacity would be improved. 
(see eg. Smilie 2001; Byombuka 2004) However, partnerships of this nature can be 
precarious- the occasional use of implementing partners in Rwanda had resulted in 
money lost -or at least not accurately accounted for (DeWaal 1997: 195-7). For 
international humanitarian organisations it is vital that local partners are able to follow 
the accountability standards they use- so that the international organisations 
themselves will be able to accurately report how they have used the funds to their 
donors. 
This development created a niche for OFADEC. They were a well respected 
implementing partner of UNHCR- and had learned to adapt to international forms of 
financial reporting. They were professional, yet small, and they spoke the language of 
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the international humanitarians. (Fresia 2009) In short, they were the perfect 
representatives of local implementing partners that the humanitarian governance 
network needed. The many small scale local civil society organisations that could 
potentially be a valuable asset in international humanitarian responses, naturally lack a 
common voice. This gave OFADEC a remarkable power advantage in the 
humanitarian governance network. Being a prime example of a small, yet highly 
legitimate, local actor, put them in a position where they could speak on behalf of 
those the global humanitarians wanted to reach.
OFADEC became an active member of ICVA- eventually leading to them representing 
ICVA on the board of the Sphere-project.  OFADEC was active in HAP- in a period 
even holding a position on the board. (SPHERE 2012) They became the first 
organisation to ever meet the certification criteria for HAP13 - a mark of quality they 
still only share with twelve other organisations (HAP 2012). They even gained 
impasse to the Active Learning Network for Accountability Practices (ALNAP), 
which has been accused of being an elite instrument of only the most important 
humanitarian organisations and donors (see Stein 2009).  They were among the 
original signatories of the Principles of Partnership- and represented themselves in the 
forum- as an equal alongside ICVA.  At the moment OFADEC has recently run two 
types of projects, a scholarship project funded by UNHCR in Dakar, and assisting 
programs for UNHCR's repatriation of Mauritanian refugees. For a humanitarian 
organisation with such limited funds- very few operative programs, and none outside 
of Senegal,14 the organisation has had a remarkable influence on global humanitarian 
governance. To make a comparison, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) is 
operative in 42 countries and has an annual budget of well over 300 million US dollars 
(International Rescue Committee 2010: 4). IRC use the Sphere-project standards in 
their work, accepting their guidance as legitimate with regards to minimum standards 
(Rupp 2005). Yet IRC does not have a board member in the Sphere-project, while 
OFADEC does. Comparing the Ego-networks of these two organisations below makes 
this point clear. OFADEC with its budget measured in thousands of Franc is as well 
13 Authors telephone interview with Mr Ndiaye (CEO of OFADEC) 18.05.2012
14 Authors telephone interview with Mr Ndiaye (CEO of OFADEC) 18.05.2012
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represented- and in more exclusive forums- than the giant IRC.
IRC is a member of all three major consortia VOICE, InterAction, and ICVA. They 
participated in the Principles of Partnership, and while not certified, are still members 
of HAP. That is to say, it seems clear that IRC wishes to have influence over the 
humanitarian governance network. OFADEC's relative success compared to the giant 
IRC seems to support the claim that legitimacy is better measure of importance than 
available funds.
Another key question then becomes, what is in it for OFADEC? With very limited 
operational capacity, why is advantageous for them to influence global humanitarian 
governance? The short answer is: it is not. OFADEC does not need to influence global 
humanitarian governance to increase the legitimacy of their own programs. In terms of 
transnational humanitarianism, they are not even a relevant actor. However, as they 
have such small programs it is no issue for them to adapt their practices to conform to 
international governance initiatives. A case in point is OFADEC's relationship to HAP. 
In 2009, HAP conducted an evaluation of OFADEC's accountability practices. The 
findings were presented in a public case study which concluded that “This is 
accountability at its best!”(Haw 2010: 3) For IRC, implementing the HAP standards 
would probably entail a vast institutional reform, but with only two programs it 
becomes significantly easier for OFADEC. Being presented by HAP as a prime 
example of their standards in practice increases OFADEC's legitimacy in itself, while 
the cost in adapting programs is relatively low. In short, while the large organisations 
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might need to use their influence to increase the legitimacy of their modi operandi, 
OFADEC needs the legitimacy of the governance initiatives and can adapt their modus 
operandi to achieve this goal.
The reason OFADEC needs the legitimacy becomes apparent when evaluating their 
current operational context. Their original raison d'être was improving agricultural 
efficiency in Senegal. While the country is still among the less developed states (see 
UNDP 2012), OFADEC's involvement with UNHCR has moved them from 
development towards a more relief oriented practice.  They have been engaged in an 
education program in Dakar and repatriation projects in the north, both of which have 
been UNHCR financed. However, the humanitarian situation on the Mauritanian 
border is resolved- UNHCR has completed their repatriation mission in Senegal (see 
UNHCR 2012). With UNHCR terminating the major operative programs in Senegal, 
OFADEC is left without any available programs. Currently OFADEC operates as an 
unofficial focal point for 36 national NGOs in the west African region. They have 
been given projects by the UNHCR to develop workshops on efficient partnerships 
between UNHCR and their other local operative partners. Mr. Ndiaye, CEO of 
OFADEC, explained their new area of activity as follows: "We work with UNHCR to 
improve dialogue between them and implementing partners. Sometimes there are 
frustrations on both sides: so you need dialogue. We work on organising workshops to 
improve this relations."15 More recently these workshops have been expanded to cover 
UNHCR's East Africa partners as well. It seems OFADEC has found a way to 
capitalise on their niche position in the humanitarian governance network. They were 
given legitimacy as brokers between the large- and primarily Western- humanitarian 
enterprise, and the local partners they were committed to collaborate with. This 
position has translated into tangible assets for OFADEC, which will now be able to 
continue functioning as an agency specialised in that capacity.
7.5 Summary discussion
The integrative agency model- derived from DiMaggio and Powell's(1983) concept of 
isomorphic change seems a good fit. OCHA, being one of a kind, is unable to establish 
15 Authors telephone interview with Mr Ndiaye (CEO of OFADEC) 18.05.2012
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support via proficiency in the field. Even though they are a UN-agency they have no 
natural supporters in the network. This spurred them to a strategic usage of relational 
power- effectively attempting to trade their unique legitimacy for support from actors 
with more field credibility. MSF, whose legitimacy is based on independence, opposed 
standardisation attempts in the network. Fearing that standards and rules would 
decrease the legitimacy of their sporadic breed of morality- they actively opposed the 
process in the network. They used their relational power, and their isomorphic 
leadership, in influencing other French NGOs to support them. Their attempted use of 
the brokerage role granted them by the French NGOs to force the sphere-project on a 
different path failed. In part because they did not have sufficient brokerage power. The 
organisations willing to follow them were too few and too small to be of major 
consequence. CARE too use their available power resources to maximise the 
legitimacy of their modus operandi. They were more successful in influencing the 
governance network to suite their purpose, partially because of their greater brokerage, 
and partially as they followed a policy of participation and partial adaptation. They 
were able to use their relational power because they adapted to the expectations of 
more actors when they adopted the rights-based-approach. While CARE succeeded 
and MSF did not, their actions were motivated by the same desire and their strategies 
were both based on using relational power. Finally OFADEC illustrates the point of 
view of those following the isomorphic leaders. OFADEC did not need to influence 
the network- but the legitimacy granted them by broad participation proved vital for 
their continued survival. This again shows that funding becomes secondary to 
legitimacy- a highly legitimate actor will be funded- whereas a actor with high funding 
need not necessarily get the legitimacy or power necessary to influence humanitarian 
governance.  
What of the operative definition of power? Is relational power the primary power-
resource in humanitarian governance and can it be operationalised as through 
membership? The Case of OCHA demonstrates that shared membership certainly does 
not entail shared interests. The other UN-agencies participated in IASC, but apparently 
not out of a desire to support OCHA's claim to leadership over the sector. However, 
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OCHAs weak connection to the rest of the humanitarian governance network was, in 
part, reflected in their low degree of participation. Regardless of this, they were able to 
solicit support from well connected nodes- by capitalising on their legitimacy as a UN-
mandated coordinator. This legitimacy is one of the aspects that cannot be captured by 
SNA. The same was evident in the case of MSF, were their ties to other francophone 
NGO's was not clearly represented in joint memberships. MSF's isomorphic leadership 
was not reflected in membership. Had COMPAS Qualité evolved into a sustainable 
competitor of the Sphere-standards, this would not have been the case. MSF's 
isomorphic leadership could then probably have been reflected in their members. 
However, that remains besides the point. The key observation is that while 
membership can be an indicator of relational power, the informal aspect of isomorphic 
leadership is not captured in the operative definitions of relational power through 
membership. The same can be observed in the CARE case. While clearly an important 
broker between the European and American humanitarian traditions, this is not 
reflected in membership. While they are members of InterAction, the SNA 
formalisation does not show how important they are within InterAction. Other 
organisations, such as IRC, are members of both VOICE and InterAction, and will 
therefore be portrayed as more important brokers between the Europeans and 
Americans. Finally, the case of OFADEC shows that membership need not necessarily 
be used as a means of influencing humanitarian governance. While they might use 
membership to promote their legitimacy, this is done by adapting to standards rather 
than adapting the standards to suit themselves. While this demonstrates that legitimacy 
is important, it warrants a nuanced view on membership and power. While OFADEC 
holds an influential position in the network, it is not in their interests to use that power 
to shape humanitarian governance. It is therefore unclear whether they can be said to 
have power over humanitarian governance, or if it is better to say that humanitarian 
governing mechanisms have power over them.
I find the conditions specified in hypothesis 4-7 adequately met. While some caveats 
are necessary with regards to the concrete operationalisations and the limits of the 
data, the case discussions none the less demonstrate the applicability of the integrative 
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model. While the strict operationalisations should be re-evaluated with regards to 
validity- the underlying concepts do show their usefulness in analysing humanitarian 
governance and power.
7.6 Additional Observations
The selected cases are only four of the 656 organisations in the analysis. While chosen 
on the basis of most different- such a small case selection does not warrant a 
generalisation to the whole population. The rest of the network has also been 
investigated- and here I wish to summarise some key observations with regards to the 
different components of relational power. 
7.6.1 Participation
The humanitarian governance network exists in what I have described as a quasi-
anarchy. As a result there are several ways in which actors can seek to maximise their 
influence by strategic positioning within the network. Local offices provide one such 
route. Consider the major NGO-consortia represented in the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC). By hierarchical logic, InterAction should represent the US-based 
NGOs, while  ICVA- as an international consortia- should represent the rest. In theory 
the entire humanitarian community could be represented by one of these in the IASC. 
In reality this is not how these consortia function. Membership is naturally quite open, 
even the regional criteria are quite loose, making it easy to manipulate the 
representation scheme. The International Medical Corps is one example among many: 
The organisation has offices in both the UK and the US and has registered the UK 
office as a UK charity with a separate board. However, they share the same CEO and 
publish a joint Annual Report (cf. Mercy Corps UK 2012; Mercy Corps USA 2012). 
Legally, they might be seen as separate organisations- in reality the UK office might 
best be described as a local branch. Mercy Corps is a member of all three consortia, 
effectively giving them three routes to IASC. Similar constellations can be found for 
organisations such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the International 
Medical Corps (IMC) and the Medical Relief International (MERLIN). In other words, 
there seems to be some indication of participation maximising strategies- at least 
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among some actors. 
An interesting side note is that organisations such as CARE, Oxfam, MSF, CARITAS, 
and Save the Children, who are all members of SCHR, do not follow this pattern of 
maximising representation. Which is interesting, as their corporate governance 
structure provides more independence to the national offices than in the case of Mercy 
Corps (cf. CARE International 2012; Caritas Internationalis 2012; MSF 2012; Save the 
Children 2012) . This would again seem to point to qualitative differences between 
governance mechanisms. Membership in SCHR, granting almost direct access to 
IASC, makes additional representation superfluous. 
7.6.2 Brokerage
Brokerage is the power gained by holding a position between two cliques of actors. 
Another element of brokerage is representation. That is- the ability to claim 
representation of actors otherwise unconnected to the network. Formally, in SNA, 
these are two components of the same phenomena. With regards to representation, the 
religious humanitarian organisations present a challenge. While the humanitarian 
governance network primarily consists of humanitarian organisations, the challenge 
for the Christian organisations is also to gain the support of churches and ecumenical 
societies. The affiliations of individual churches have not been included in this 
analysis, but with regards to brokerage- this aspect warrants some further discussion.
The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is an interesting example, it is a governance 
mechanism rather than an organisation- in that it seeks to govern the activities of 
several different actors. However, the actors are churches, not organisations, so they 
are not included in the analysis. The LWF is a global communion of Christian 
churches in the Lutheran tradition. Founded in 1947 in Lund, Sweden, the LWF now 
has 145 member churches in 79 countries all over the world. Representing some 70 
million Christians- and thereby becoming the conductor of substantial humanitarian 
funds. Their ambition is to establish a communion of churches that will promote 
accountable and coordinated humanitarian relief. (LWF 2012) 
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There is, however, also a Lutheran World Relief (LWR). LWR has the same global 
ambition as LWF, but with less focus on accountability and coordination and a greater 
focus on the religious message. Their mission statement gives a fair synopsis: 
“Affirming God’s love for all people, we work with Lutherans and partners around the 
world to end poverty, injustice and human suffering”(LWR 2012). These to initiatives 
are not unaware of each other, as they share a membership in the ACT Alliance. Their 
failure to collaborate into one single Lutheran representative would seem to be best 
explained by the Dunantist / Wilsonian divide- as it manifests in a religious setting. 
LWR is based in the US while LWF originated in Sweden. LWF has extended their 
activities into the North-American continent, but note that they have limited success. 
“In North America 'communion' is not a concept that is easily understood.” They do 
however hope that as  “the member churches in North America grow in their 
understanding they [will recognize that]  partnerships, responsibilities and 
accountability [...] calls them to.” (LWF 2012) While LWR is only members of the 
Act-alliance and Interaction, LWF has secured membership in SCHR and the Sphere-
board, in addition to their membership in ICVA and HAP. It would seem that in terms 
of influence, LWR would profit from an inclusion in LWF. However, the 
disagreement with regards to the extent of “communion” as governance, seems to have 
been too severe.
The analytical point of this discussion is to demonstrate that while brokerage and reach 
are mutually constituting, divergent interests with regards to divergent forms of 
legitimacy, can hamper an organisations ability to establish brokerage. Consider the 
tripartite consortia represented in  IASC as an additional example. ICVA has the 
ambition of representing all the worlds humanitarian NGOs, but organisations still 
choose to be affiliated with VOICE and InterAction instead. While several 
organisations hold double or even triple memberships- ICVA's inability to establish an 
effective global brokerage would seem to indicate that diverging interests can manifest 
in memberships.
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7.6.3 Reach
With regards to reach, the Humanitarian Forum (HF) presents an interesting case. 
They are established as a governing mechanisms with the stated purpose of acting as 
brokers between the Western and Islamic relief agencies (Humanitarian Forum 2006). 
However, to become a broker they must first extend their reach. To accomplish this 
goal they set up a main branch office in the UK, and from there open national forums 
in Islamic countries. While this provides contact with Islamic relief agencies, they still 
need to get hooked into the broader humanitarian network in order to function as 
brokers. Rather than joining ICVA or VOICE- they just establish a formal connection 
to the Red Cross UK, Oxfam International and Mercy Corps. In the words of the their 
director, Shaw-Hamilton (2012) this was to make use of "their perspectives, legitimacy 
and connections". As noted in the discussion above of SCHR's role vis-a-vis OCHA, it 
seems that the steering committee of the HF functions in the same way as SCHR does 
for OCHA. While one is a UN mandated coordinator of all things humanitarian, the 
other is a relative small civil society initiative from the UK. However, when faced with 
the challenge of governing the humanitarian field, both actors need to take in use the 
same relational power strategies. A second key observation is that brokerage can breed 
more brokerage. Oxfam, Mercy Corps and the Red Cross are already major actors in 
the network- their position makes them attractive members of governance mechanisms 
that need to extend their reach. That is, organisations such as Oxfam, Mercy Corps, 
and the Red Cross, have their reach extended partly as consequence of their already 
high reach.
8 Analysis Part- 3
How are the core components of relational power distributed among the actors in the 
humanitarian governance network? Below I present the results of each analysis and 
discuss the implications of the findings. The discussion above has been a looser 
discussion of the construct of relational power in humanitarian governance. The 
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discussion below presents the results of the operative measure of these ideas. When 
clarified from a construct to a measurement, the ideas of the construct where 
formalised and applied to a dataset. It is therefore important to consider the validity of 
these in relation to the findings. 
8.1 Participation
The most active organisations in the humanitarian governance network are shown 
below in table 5. This is actually nothing more than a sum of the memberships each 
organisation holds, nominalised to the right. CARE international tops the list with nine 
memberships, but the other large scale humanitarian organisations are all listed among 
the top five placements. A notable exception is MSF, but this is natural- as they have 
had a good reason to withdraw from humanitarian governance. All measures 
calculated by UCINET (Borgatti, Everett et al. 2002) see Appendix 1.
Rank Organisation (s) Outwards 
Degree
Nominal* 
Outward
1 Care International 9 0.563
2 World Vision 8 0.500
3 International Medical Corps, International  
Rescue Comittee,  Save the Children, Oxfam 
International
7 0.438
4 Islamic Relief World Wide, Concern Worldwide,  
ActionAid International, Lutheran World  
Federation, International Federation of the Red 
Cross, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council  
6 0.375
5 Christian Aid, OFADEC, Medical Relief  
International, Danish Refugee Council,  
International Committee of the Red Cross 
5 0.313
* Note that the nominal degree is calculated on the 2-mode dataset seperating first and second mode units. See  
Appendix A
Tabell 5: Degree Centrality of Organisations
What the table above does not depict is the organisations direct contact with others via 
common forums. As shown in table 6 below, there are large differences in the number 
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of organisations that are members of each governing mechanism. InterAction, the US 
NGO consortium, tops the list with 184 member organisations. The General 
Humanitarian Platform becomes meagre in comparison, having only four members. 
These calculations are conducted on the first mode of the 2-mode dataset, so relations 
between the governing mechanisms have been excluded. None the less, it would be 
interesting to see how many organisations each ego is in contact with via each of the 
major forums. How broad an ego network do the organisations actually have?
Rank Governing Mechanism (s) In Degree Nominal In
1 InterAction 184 .287
2 People in Aid 173 .270
3 Act-alliance 120 .188
4 VOICE 82 .128
5 ACFID 74 .116
6 ICVA 66 .103
7 HAP 64 .100
8 ALNAP, Principles of Partnership 31 .048
9 Aktion Hilft 21 .033
10 IASC 15 .023
11 SPHERE 13 .020
12 Humanitarian Forum 12 .019
13 SCHR 9 .014
14 ECBP 5 .008
15 GHP 4 .006
NB: The membership in-degree is measured in the first mode of the 2-mode network- relations between governing  
mechanisms are therefore not represented (ie: IASC has four more members,Voice InterAction, ICVA and SCHR- not  
represented in calulation)
Tabell 6: Degree Centrality of Governing Mechanisms
To measure this aspect of degree centrality, the 2-mode dataset was recomputed into 
an affiliations Dataset (see Appendix A). Affiliations degree centrality is based on a 
dataset where organisations who are both member of the same governing mechanism 
are registered by a direct tie. The affiliated degree centrality gives a measure of how 
many other organisations each ego interacts with via the governing mechanisms.
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While CARE International topped the list for degree centrality, the International 
Rescue Committee, International Medical Corps, Concern Worldwide, and ActionAid, 
all have a broader ego-network in terms of affiliations. Theoretically, this means that 
they have direct contact with more humanitarian actors- and therefore have the 
opportunity to influence more organisations. However it is not necessarily clear that 
this translates into a relational power advantage. The high affiliations are partially a 
consequence of high participation in governing mechanisms (see table 6 above), but 
also a consequence of a broad presence in the regional consortia. All three of the top 
ranking organisations in the affiliations table 7  below, share the quality that they are 
members of all three major consortia, ICVA, VOICE and InterAction. Their high 
affiliations degree is therefore caused by the high number of organisations that are 
exclusively members of one of these. This does give them an advantage in terms of 
being represented in more fora, but the high number of members in the consortia also 
imply that the organisations ability to influence joint policy is proportionately reduced. 
That is, because there are many members, and because the consortia are built on 
democratic principles, the relative influence of member votes is low. Several of these 
organisations are also members of People in Aid. As has been discussed this 
organisation is somewhere between a governing mechanism and a service provider- it 
is dubious that organisation will exert power over the humanitarian field by 
implementing People in Aid's human resource policies.
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Rank Organisation (s) Outwards 
Degree
Nominal 
Outward
1 International Resue Comittee 642 12.207
2 International Medical Corps 606 11.854
3 Concern Worldwide, ActionAid International 594 11.620
4 CARE International 567 11.092
5 Medical Relief International 564 11.033
6 Islamic Relief Worldwide 530 10.368
7 Mercy Corps 516 10.094
8 HelpAge International 483 9.448
9 Christian Aid 465 9.096
10 Habitat for Humanity 448 8.764
Tabell 7: Affiliations Degree Centrality
Another organisation which is a surprise inclusion among the top ten organisations in 
table 7. is Habitat for Humanity. While it could be argued that they are a humanitarian 
organisation specialised in shelter, their programs are not exclusive to emergency 
situations. The major questions of accountability, minimum standards, and response 
coordination, are not that relevant for Habitat. Their modus operandi is to help 
individuals and communities construct housing- partially based on funding help and 
partially based on voluntary action. This response speciality is more relevant for the 
time "long after humanitarian aid organizations have completed their relief work" 
(Habitat for Humanity 2012). They are in other words an organisation on the fringe of 
what constitutes a humanitarian organisation. So why do they have so many 
affiliations in the humanitarian governance network? As it turns out, this is a 
consequence of a co-occurrence of several fringe governance mechanisms. Habitat are 
a big organisation in Australia (see Habitat for Humanity 2012), so they are naturally 
members of ACFID. As the organisation is originally American, they are also 
members of InterAction. They do have employees working in difficult situations, so 
membership in People in Aid comes natural. Finally, they have a successful German 
office, which has given them membership in Aktion Hilft. While all these governing 
mechanisms are relevant actors in humanitarian governance (see Chapter 4. Data), not 
all their members need to have an interest in humanitarian governance. To phrase it in 
Humanitarian Governance: Network, Agency and Power
Analysis Part- 3 95
another way, there are other good reasons to join these organisations than a desire to 
influence humanitarian governance.
So while the degree centrality in Table 6 provides an overview of how active 
organisations are in the governance network, it doesn't provide any means of 
evaluating the relative significance of each governing mechanism. The number of 
organisations involved in each governing mechanism also provides an unsatisfactory 
answer to this question, as membership denotes a different phenomena in the different 
governing mechanisms. Affiliations does not ease this issue, as was seen in the case of 
Habitat for Humanity, as fringe organisations are valued as highly in the network as 
clear-cut humanitarian organisations.
8.2 Brokerage 
Brokerage is the ability to confer governance initiatives from one actor to another. 
Operationalised in this analysis to placement on the shortest geodesic path between 
two nodes. The assumed relational power advantaged gained by brokerage, is that 
brokers are in a better negotiating position as they have control over the spread of a 
governance initiative to other actors. Brokerage can manifest in two different ways- 
organisation to network and organisation to organisation. The latter of theses is 
represented as affiliation betweenness in the table 8 below. While the former, network 
brokerage, is represented in the Scale-free betweenness. All measures calculated by 
UCINET(Borgatti, Everett et al. 2002).
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Scale-free Betweenness Affiliations Betweenness
Rank nBetwee
n*
Organisation(s) nBetwee
n
Organisation(s)
1 2.482 CARE International 3.291 Islamic Relief Worldwide
2 2.194 Islamic Relief 2.942 Habitat for Humanity
3 2.177 Habitat for Humanity 2.777 Act for Peace
4 1.953 ActionAid 
International
2.630 Christian Aid/Church World Service
5 1.798 Act for Peace 2.423 Marie Stopes International
6 1.507 UnitingWorld 2.378 Christian Aid
7 1.372 Mercy Corps 2.297 Int. Orthodox Christian Charities
8 1.317 Oxfam International 2.225 Uniting World
9 1.293 CBM Australia 2.203 Mercy Corps
10 1.119 World Vision 2.182 International Rescue Committee
*As Brokerage is of the same consequence, regardless of whether the node is an organisation or a governing  
mechanism, the Scale-free network is nominalised by both first and second mode nodes.
Tabell 8: Betwenness Centrality
It is unsurprising that CARE tops the list once again. As was extensively discussed in 
the case study above (see Analysis Part 2), they adapted to the network in a way that 
placed them in a brokerage position between the Wilsonian and Dunantist, or perhaps 
rather the American and European, humanitarian traditions. Likewise, Oxfam's 
inclusion among the top ten can be explained by a similar phenomena. They are an 
organisation with solid European traditions. Conceived in the academic circles of 
Oxford University- the organisation has later spread to several European countries: 
fronting the Dunantist values of independence and impartiality. (see Oxfam 
International 2012) They have now opened offices in the US, and collaborate closely 
with CARE through the ECB project. If CARE is the American bridge to Europe, 
Oxfam can be seen as the European bridge to America. 
The high ranking of Islamic Relief also seems intuitive. Islamic Relief is a British 
organisation, with headquarters in London. It has offices in the US and in Germany, 
granting it membership in InterAction, VOICE and Aktion Hilft. (Islamic Relief 
Worldwide 2012) They are well placed in the central governance network- 
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participating in HAP, and with Aktion Hilft as connection point to the Sphere project. 
At the same time they are a member of Humanitarian Forum, and among the very few 
Islamic organisations in the network. In other words, it seems natural to view Islamic 
Relief as a key broker between the Western humanitarian network and the newer 
Islamic humanitarian organisations (see Macrae and Harmer 2003: 44-6). However, a 
just as likely explanation of their high betweenness degree is their joint membership in 
InterAction, VOICE and People in Aid. When considering the additional network 
brokerage gained by membership in Aktion Hilft, which includes several nodes 
otherwise weakly linked to the network, it seems more likely that Islamic Relief are 
ranked high in brokerage because of their membership in large governing mechanisms 
with weakly connected nodes. This suspicion is increased by their position as the 
highest ranking on affiliations brokerage. There are simply too few Islamic 
humanitarian organisations in the network for it to impact this strongly.
The continued dominant presence of organisations with large branches in Australia is 
also a source of concern. As was noted during data sampling, the Australian NGO 
consortium ACFID was a borderline inclusion. While some of its' members are clearly 
humanitarian, several others are better described as development agencies. The high 
brokerage of CBM Australia, UnitingWorld, Habitat for Humanity, and Marie Stopes 
seems to indicate that the betweenness results have been skewered in favour of ACFID 
members. It is natural that several members in ACFID will be poorly connected to the 
humanitarian governance network, as most of them are primarily development 
organisations. However, in the SNA analysis the nodes are given equal weight- and 
Australian humanitarian NGOs become brokers between the Australian development 
organisations and the rest of the humanitarian network. The dominance of Australian 
NGOs in the betweenness measure is in other words an automorphism of the inclusion 
of ACFID in the dataset.
While the idea of brokerage seemed relevant in the earlier discussion, it is not 
completely clear that the idea is adequately captured by the mathematical 
operationalisation. This will be further discussed under the validity chapter.
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8.3 Reach
Reach is the extent to which an actor can reach the entire network- corrected for the 
power subtracted by the brokers. In terms of relational power, degree is that idea that 
once you influence a certain number of actors in the ego-network, they in turn can 
influence those in their ego-networks. Table 9. below shows the nominalised  reach of 
the organisations in terms of scale-free and 2-mode affiliations (see Method Chapter). 
All calculations conducted in UCINET (Borgatti, Everett et al. 2002) see Appendix 1.
Scale-free Reach Affiliations Reach
Ran
k
nBetween
*
Organisation(s) nBetwee
n
Organisation(s)
1 .462 CARE International,  
ActionAid 
International
.860 International Rescue Committee
3 .459 International Medical  
Corps
.857 International Medical Corps
4 .458 International Rescue 
Comittee
.856 Concern Worldwide, ActionAid  
International
5 .456 Concern Worldwide .844 Medical Relief International
6 .451 Medical Relief  
International
.840 Islamic Relief Worldwide
7 .449 Mercy Corps .832 Mercy Corps
8 .446 Islamic Relief  
Worldwide
.831 CARE International
9 .440 HelpAge International .820 Habitat for Humanity
10 .431 ICCO .814 HelpAge International
*As Reach is of the same consequence, regardless of whether the node is an organisation or a governing  
mechanism, the Scale-free network is nominalised by both first and second mode nodes.
Tabell 9: Reach Centrality Organisations
Again the dominance of CARE is apparent. Their placement in the network allows for 
an efficient  communication with a large part of the actors involved in humanitarian 
governance. While the Australian organisations were important with regards to 
brokerage, they do not dominate as clearly in  terms of reach. Naturally being placed 
among central actors in the network is a greater advantage than having easy access to 
relatively isolated nodes. Again International Medical Corps and the International 
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Rescue Committee do well. The strategy of having membership in several major NGO 
consortia seems to pay off. The absence of Oxfam, indeed the absence of any 
European NGO outside of Islamic Relief and HelpAge,16 is a bit strange. Why do the 
Europeans have such a poor reach relative to the Americans? A part of the answer is 
obviously that VOICE has 82 members to InterActions 184. As a consequence, 
American NGOs with a single membership in a consortia reach 182 actor by the 
second extension, while the equivalent Europeans reach only 82. While partially 
explainable, this is not necessarily an automorphism- and can seem to indicate a 
relative dominance of American humanitarian organisations over European. The reach 
measure should partially compensate the dominance in the first degree as the measure 
extends. Disregarding the influence of a governing mechanism17, it seems that the 
American NGOs, despite their scepticism to litigations (see Macrae and Harmer 2003: 
33) might be more central in the humanitarian governance network than their 
European counterparts. A part of the explanation for this can also be InterActions 
presence in the IASC and the absence of VOICE.
The Table 10 below shows the reach centrality of the governing mechanisms. Both 
InterAction and People in Aid also had the top positions in the inn-degree centrality 
table, however, it is interesting to note that ICVA has higher ranking than the Act-
Alliance in terms of reach. The Act-Alliance has almost twice as many direct members 
as ICVA, but it is clear that the ICVA members are much better placed within the 
network. The principles of partnership also have a much higher reach centrality than 
one would expect. It would seem that the choice of participants for the original PoP 
meeting was a good one, engaging organisations with a diverging patterns of 
membership. Another interesting observation is that individual humanitarian 
organisations can have a greater reach than governing mechanisms. CARE 
16 HelpAge is an interesting case. They characterise themselves as a network rather than an organisation, but are 
organised as a corporate organisations with national NGOs as implementing partners. The headquarters are in 
London, but the organisation evolved simultaneously in Canada, UK, Kenya, India, and Colombia. (See 
HelpAge 2012)
17 The Europeans are well represented in SPHERE- one of the qualitatively most influential governing 
mechanisms, as well as in HAP- and to a certain extent ALNAP.
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International has a reach centrality of .462 to ALNAPs .443.18 ALNAP has 31 
members, but the size of the ego-network falls compared to CARE's extended contacts. 
Rank nReach Governance-mechanism
1 0.554 InterAction
2 0.541 People in Aid
3 0.518 ICVA
4 0.493 Act-Alliance
5 0.482 Principles of Partnership
6 0.475 HAP
7 0.466 VOICE
8 0.461 SPHERE
9 0.443 ALNAP
10 0.429 ACFID
11 0.423 General Humanitarian Platform
12 0.398 IASC
13 0.388 SCHR
14 0.361 Aktion Hilft
15 0.355 Humanitarian Forum
16 0.326 ECBP
*This calculation was done on the scale-free network under the assumption that 
reach carries equal substantive meaning for both 1-mode and 2-mode actors.
Tabell 10: Reach Centrality Governance Mechanisms
Again the idea of reach, which seemed relevant in the earlier discussion, might not be 
adequately captured by the mathematical operationalisation. The inherent short-comings of 
SNA as a method become evident in the result- and choices in data sampling clearly have a 
significant impact on the measures.
8.4 Answering the research question 
I asked the question: What actors have power and influence over the political processes  
aimed at producing humanitarian governance? The ambition of the discussion above was to 
provide a clear cut answer. However, the shortcomings of the data necessitate certain caveats:
18 The analysis of scale-free reach centrality uses the same nominalisation for both modes of data. So the results 
are comparable between governing mechanisms and humanitarian organisations.
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Assuming that the data selected constitutes the entire humanitarian governance network. In 
which all actors are presumed to be humanitarian organisations- and all are presumed to have 
equal power and influence prior to their position in the governance network. Further assuming 
that no other means of exerting power exist, outside the facets of relational power- and no 
other routes of influence exist outside those delineated by membership. Then the data above 
would give grounds to conclude that:
1) The most active participants in the network, who therefore have the greatest potential to 
influence humanitarian governance, are: CARE International, World Vision, International 
Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Save the Children, and Oxfam International.
2) The actors best positioned as brokers, thereby gaining an advantage in negotiations, are: 
CARE International, Islamic Relief, Habitat for Humanity, and Action Aid International. Of 
these, the best positioned to broker between individual organisations are Islamic Relief and 
Habitat for Humanity. 
3) The actors with the most effective reach through the humanitarian governance network, 
thereby allowing them to effectively influence the largest portion of the network, are: CARE 
International, ActionAid, International Medical Corps, and International Rescue Committee. 
Of these, the organisations with the greatest ability to reach other individual organisations are 
International Rescue Committee and International Medical Corps.
9 Discussion of validity 
While the research question only dealt with the distribution of power in the process 
aimed at producing humanitarian governance, the road to answering that question 
implicated several other theoretical aspects. Some of these are necessary parts of the 
analysis, and their validity should be discussed on equal footing with the 
measurements of relational power above. Below I discuss the validity of the findings 
under the framework of Adcock and Collier's (2001) shared standards of measurement 
validity between qualitative and quantitative approaches. As has been mentioned, 
despite its' mathematical aspects social network analysis is best viewed as a qualitative 
approach.
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9.1 Concepts 
There were several concepts involved in this analysis. The first was the concept of 
humanitarian organisations, ideally viewed as a separate from development 
organisations in that they relieve immediate suffering, rather than long-term injustice. 
The second concept was the transnational humanitarian anarchy, defined in contrast to 
the dominant portrayals of anarchy in the IR literature. Transnational anarchy was 
defined as a more gentle than the Hobbesian state of nature, and less commercially 
oriented than deMolinari's free-market anarchism. Theoretically, it was seen as better 
portrayed by Kropotkin's classical description of anarchy as a form of organisation. 
The third concept was that of the integrative model of humanitarian agency. 
Humanitarian organisations were presumed to seek legitimacy over funding, and to 
follow successful leaders in the humanitarian field. This led to the conclusion that 
power needed to be defined as relational power. All the  humanitarian organisations 
sought to maximise their legitimacy through humanitarian governance, but their ability 
to do so would be determined by their relations to others in the field.
9.2 Systematised Concept Validity
The concept of humanitarian organisations was systematised to mean an organisation 
involved in emergency relief in states other than those in which they had their origin. 
The validity of this systematised concept follow almost directly from the theoretical 
definition of humanitarianism and can be seen to have face validity. The concept of the 
transnational humanitarian anarchy was systematised as a large scale network. As 
Kropotkin (1910) described it “the complex web of voluntary associations would 
represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and 
federations” which seems an apt description of a social network. Again I would argue 
the perceiving the the transnational humanitarian anarchy as a network, has face 
validity. The integrative model proved a greater challenge in terms of systematisation, 
but was eventually summarised as organisations seeking legitimacy by maximising the 
value of their available capital. The choice not to present a complete list of what 
constitutes relevant capital, weakened the analytical strength of the model. However, 
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when faced with the broad fauna of humanitarian organisations and their respective 
sources of legitimacy, this would in retrospect seem a correct choice. Relational power 
was systematised to mean participation, brokerage, and reach. While these do not 
follow directly from the concept of relational power, they can be seen as further 
development of the idea. 
9.3 Indicator Validity
Humanitarian organisations were indicated by their participation in humanitarian 
governing mechanisms. It was presumed that only organisations fitting the description 
above would find it relevant to participate in the humanitarian governance network. 
This proved a faulty assumption, as there were several organisations included in the 
analysis which did not meet the criteria for my systematic concept of humanitarian 
organisation. The validity of the indicator for humanitarian organisations is therefore 
partially invalid. However, as has been extensively discussed earlier, the core of the 
issue of humanitarian governance is the search for a common definition of what 
humanitarianism is. While it seemed theoretically intuitive to provide a clear 
distinction between humanitarianism and development aid- the reality is that this 
boundary is more fluid. Humanitarian organisations conduct development work, and 
development organisations have a stake in the humanitarian field. The disadvantages 
of not having the theoretical concept of humanitarianism delineating the network were 
severe. However, when faced with the reality of the phenomena of humanitarian 
governance- I do not see that it could have been done in another way. Attempting to 
filter the 656 organisations based on a qualitative evaluation of the extent to which 
they conduct emergency relief- would have been even more compromising to the 
validity of the findings.
The social network of humanitarian governance was indicated by the patterns of 
membership in transnational governance mechanisms. Relations, or edges, were 
defined by membership, and actors, or nodes, indicated by organisations being 
members. The data on the network was gathered by a snow-ball sample. While 
initially hoping to conduct the sample under strict edge-definitions, it became apparent 
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that this could not be done. The empirical reality did not lend itself easily to strict a 
priori assumptions. A consequence of the  “the complex web of voluntary 
associations”(Kropotkin 1910) is that membership entails different forms of relations 
in different organisations operating out of different national contexts. The idea of 
“membership” as an ontologically homogeneous phenomena was faulty- making clear 
delineations of the network difficult. I chose to sacrifice the validity of the network as 
consisting of equivalent ties- so as to better capture the observed phenomena. This was 
advantageous in terms of providing a more accurate description of the humanitarian 
governance network- but inevitably also compromised the validity of the formal 
operative definitions of relational power.
Relational power was indicated by the measures of degree- betweenness- and reach 
centrality. Again I would argue that these indicators have theoretical face validity. The 
concepts are precisely defined in the measures- and provide the exact essence of 
participation, brokerage and reach. However, the relations on which these measures 
were applied were memberships in governing mechanisms. The core concept of 
relational power was developed through the idea of isomorphic leadership. Highly 
legitimate actors would be able to influence the actions of others by setting an 
example. By limiting the idea of relations in the social network to only be delineated 
by membership, a vital facet of relational power was excluded from the formal 
analysis. As was seen in the case of MSF's exit from Sphere, an organisation can view 
another as an isomorphic leader without it being reflected in terms of formal 
membership. As has been mentioned these measures were also compromised by the 
fact that neither the nodes, nor the edges, could substantively be viewed as indicators 
of equivalent phenomena. Humanitarian organisations proved too varied to be 
adequately reduced to ontologically equivalent nodes. Likewise, the concept of 
membership proved too varied to constitute ontologically equivalent edges.
9.4 Measurement Validity
The measurements in this analysis fall along two lines of enquiry, the structural 
measure of the network as a whole and the ego-measures for each organisation. The 
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implications of the sacrifices made in choosing indicators are somewhat different for 
the two.
In measuring the structure I am attempting to capture the essence of organisation in the 
humanitarian transnational anarchy. The ambition is to provide measures that describe 
the structure generated by “the complex web of voluntary associations would represent 
an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations” 
(Kropotkin 1910). These measures do not necessarily demand the ontological 
equivalence of nodes and edges, only that the data accurately reflects the observed 
phenomena. The pattern of associations are described as openly as possible in the 
network- I have systematically valued accurate depictions over a priori assumptions in 
the sampling choices made. A critique of the structure would rather have to be direct at 
the edge-definition of the network: where does the social governance network end? 
The infinite variety is a not an exaggeration. As was discussed in the sampling chapter, 
it is very hard to precisely define the distinction between a single organisation and a 
corporate centre with affiliated branches. As has also been discussed extensively in the 
theory chapter (see Extrovert, Introvert and Affective organisations) it is not absolutely 
clear whether the central organisations have effective control over their field offices. 
Choosing organisations as the lowest unit of analysis is therefore not a clear-cut 
choice, and the network boundary produced  must necessarily be defined as a bit 
blurry. None the less, the described network captures the major governance initiative 
in the literature on humanitarian governance, and the organisations are those listed as 
members. I would therefore argue that despite its' short-comings, the structural 
measures of the network as a whole do describe the phenomenon they sought to 
describe.
The ego-measures sought to capture the underlying concept of relational power. While 
the operative definitions of these hold face validity, the ego-measures interact poorly 
with the data. Limiting the relations to membership, and assuming equivalent initial 
power, dramatically reduces the indicators validity- and this is necessarily reflected in 
the measure. The extent to which these measures are useful must be limited to the how 
they reflected the data they are applied to- and as a consequence the conclusions with 
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regards to the relational power of humanitarian organisations must be made with strict 
caveats.
10 Conclusions
10.1 The Humanitarian Transnational Anarchy
The transnational humanitarian anarchy has been shown to be the as divergent from 
the the interstate anarchy as was presumed in the introduction. However, they also 
have a degree of hierarchy- or rather organisation. The  “infinite variety of groups and 
federations of all sizes and degrees” became a better description of the phenomena 
than anticipated. The forms of organisation truly manifest in all forms: “local, 
regional, national and international temporary or more or less permanent.” (Kropotkin 
1910) While this was the original justification for the applicability of SNA to 
humanitarian governance, it also became the greatest hindrance in using the methods 
effectively. When both the ties and the actors in the network become to divergent in 
substantive content- the approach unravels. Adding the issue of boundary specification 
to the mix, does not dramatically improve the situation.
10.2 Social Network Analysis
While the findings of the mathematical analysis proved of limited value, the findings 
in the comparative analysis where strong. The implications of an anarchy, devoid of 
violence and commerce, is that relational power as a concept- if not as a formal 
construct- becomes relevant. The research does not provide grounds for concluding 
beyond the humanitarian field. Indeed- four cases might be a bit too meagre for any 
strong conclusions with regards to humanitarian field as well. However, the findings 
do indicate that the conceptual framework of Social Network Analysis might be 
applicable to the study of transnational governance. If the the study of transnational 
governance is to progress, it will have to develop an applicable concept of power. 
While I do not have sufficient grounds for concluding that this concept must be 
relational power- the study does indicate that relational power should at least be 
nominated for the position.
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So the concepts proved of use- while the operative mathematical definitions unravelled 
when they interacted with the data. Why the shortcomings? The data quality was, in 
this case, the primary issue. You cannot generate conclusions from a dataset that reach 
beyond the actual content. Membership of a broad diversity of organisations in a broad 
diversity of organisations- can only produce measures that describe just that. In 
retrospect a different approach to SNA might have resolved some of these issues. The 
primary methodological issue is dealing with the problems generated by SNA's 
assumption of the ontological equivalence of nodes. If this issue can be resolved with a 
different research design- there might be a future for formal SNA in the study of 
transnational governance.
10.3 Future Research
In retrospect, there are two approaches which might relieve, if not entirely resolve, the 
issue. One is too dramatically increase the number of nodes; the other is to 
dramatically reduce them. The key challenge is that the nodes- at least the nodes at the 
lowest level- must be comparable. Perhaps the best way to accomplish this is to 
disregard the idea of the organisation as the primal units entirely. A bottom up 
sampling method- registering  individual field offices, might produce a better dataset. 
This might also provide a resolution to the boundary specification problem: if field 
offices are registered from a limited number of contexts -known to be emergency relief 
oriented- than the network generated from them will necessarily also be “pure” 
humanitarian. The network could then be expanded, from field office to organisation, 
and from organisation to governance mechanisms. The substantive content of reach 
and brokerage would then correct for field presence- and organisations without an 
active field presence would be excluded. While this does resolve the issue of diverging 
meanings of membership, it might be a step in the right direction for resolving the 
issue of node equivalence. 
A second approach would be to dramatically reduce the number of nodes. It should be 
possible to produce an exhaustive list of humanitarian organisations with an annual 
budget above 100 million dollars. Analysing humanitarian governance- only through 
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these few organisations- would enable a more qualitative approach. It would be 
possible to add values to the nodes as attributes- indicating positions on cleavages, 
funding proportions, the number of countries in which they have offices et cetera. 
Other forms of relations, such as sharing board members, or having had the same 
CEO, could also be included. A more intensive network analysis- conjoined with a 
comparative case study of the organisations- might be more advantageous than an 
analysis with a large number of nodes.
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Appendix 1: UCINET Commands
*Calculating membership constellations
COUNT COMBINATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                          2-mode (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode)
Output dataset:                         2-mode-combinationfreqs (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\2-mode-combinationfreqs)
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  22 May 12 14:10:15
UCINET 6.391 Copyright (c) 1992-2012 Analytic Technologies
*Reversing ties
TRANSPOSE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                Scale free (C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\UCINET 
data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free)
Output dataset:               Scale free-Transp (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\Scale free-Transp)
Transposed matrix saved as dataset Scale free-Transp
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  20 May 12 20:47:05
Copyright (c) 1999-2008 Analytic Technologies
¨
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*Operation repeated for each network denoted by "-Transp." at the end of the file 
name.
*Excluded measure of Hierarchy
KRACKHARDT GTD MEASURES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                          Scale free-Transp (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free-Transp)
Output dataset:                         Scale free-Transp-GTD (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\Scale free-Transp-GTD)
Krackhardt GTD Measures
                        1
                   ------
  1 Connectedness  1.0000
  2     Hierarchy  0.0000
  3    Efficiency  0.0000
  4           LUB  1.0000
GTD measures saved as dataset: Scale free-Transp-GTD
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:11
Output generated:  22 May 12 14:47:23
UCINET 6.391 Copyright (c) 1992-2012 Analytic Technologies
*The measure is a contradiction as there is only one reciprocal tie in the data- hierarchy 
cannot be 0.0000 Likewise the efficiency of the network is clearly above 0.0000 especially 
considering the high number of nodes only connected to the network by a single node. 
Presumably an error caused by data-overload.
Hierarchy degree above one
KRACKHARDT GTD MEASURES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                ScalefreeLessThanOne-Transp (C:\Users\Joakim 
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Ulstein\Desktop\aamasteroppgave\Formal Datasets\ScalefreeLessThanOne-Transp)
Output dataset:               GTD (C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\GTD)
Krackhardt GTD Measures
                        1
                   ------
    Connectedness  1.0000
        Hierarchy  0.9994
       Efficiency  0.9829
              LUB  0.9856
GTD measures saved as dataset: GTD
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  22 May 12 14:52:36
Copyright (c) 1999-2008 Analytic Technologies
*Hierarchy Degree above 3
KRACKHARDT GTD MEASURES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                          Central Network-Transp (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Edges more than 3\Central Network-
Transp)
Output dataset:                         Central Network-Transp-GTD (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\Central Network-Transp-GTD)
Krackhardt GTD Measures
                        1
                   ------
  1 Connectedness  1.0000
  2     Hierarchy  0.9973
  3    Efficiency  0.8831
  4           LUB  0.9344
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GTD measures saved as dataset: Central Network-Transp-GTD
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  23 mai 12 02:39:54
UCINET 6.391 Copyright (c) 1992-2012 Analytic Technologies
*Hierarchy Governing Mechanisms
KRACKHARDT GTD MEASURES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                          governing-Transp (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Governing mech\governing-Transp)
Output dataset:                         governing-Transp-GTD (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\governing-Transp-GTD)
Krackhardt GTD Measures
                        1
                   ------
  1 Connectedness  0.7583
  2     Hierarchy  0.9697
  3    Efficiency  0.8718
  4           LUB  0.6282
GTD measures saved as dataset: governing-Transp-GTD
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  23 mai 12 02:41:20
UCINET 6.391 Copyright (c) 1992-2012 Analytic Technologies
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*Creating Affiliations Dataset
AFFILIATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                          2-mode (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode)
Dimension:                              ROWS
Method:                                 Cross-Products (co-occurrence)
Normalization:                          None
To view resulting matrix, run DISPLAY on the C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode-RowAff dataset.
1-mode matrix saved as dataset          2-mode-RowAff (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode-RowAff)
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 May 12 22:28:11
*Scale-free Freeman Degree Centrality
FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diagonal valid?                         NO
Model:                                  ASYMMETRIC
Input dataset:                          Scale free (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free)
Actor-by-centrality matrix saved as dataset Scale free-deg
----------------------------------------
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Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 May 12 22:09:53
*Affiliation Freeman Degree Centrality
FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diagonal valid?                         NO
Model:                                  ASYMMETRIC
Input dataset:                          2-mode-RowAff (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode-RowAff)
Note: For valued data, the normalized centrality may be larger than 100.
      Also, the centralization statistic is divided by the maximum value in the 
input dataset.
Actor-by-centrality matrix saved as dataset 2-mode-RowAff-deg
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 May 12 22:36:16
*Symmetrical Scale-free Network
SYMMETRIZE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Method:                       Maximum
Input dataset:                Scale free (C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\UCINET 
data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free)
Percentage of symmetric pairs was: 100.00%
Percentage of reciprocated ties: 100.00%
  (#(x->y AND x<-y)/#(x->y OR x<-y)
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Symmetrized matrix saved as dataset Scale free-Sym (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free-Sym)
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  20 May 12 20:50:59
Copyright (c) 1999-2008 Analytic Technologies
*Scale- Free Freeman Betweenness Centrality
FREEMAN BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                Scale free-Sym (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free-Sym)
Important note: this routine binarizes but does NOT symmetrize.
Un-normalized centralization: 58228018.247
Output actor-by-centrality measure matrix saved as dataset FreemanBetweenness
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  20 May 12 20:52:44
Copyright (c) 1999-2008 Analytic Technologies
*Affiliations Freeman Betweenness Centrality
FREEMAN BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                2-mode-RowAff (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode-RowAff)
Important note: this routine binarizes but does NOT symmetrize.
Un-normalized centralization: 4130014.500
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Network Centralization Index = 3.17%
Output actor-by-centrality measure matrix saved as dataset FreemanBetweenness
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  20 May 12 21:17:12
Copyright (c) 1999-2008 Analytic Technologies
*Scale-free Reach Centrality
REACH CENTRALITY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                Scale free-Sym (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\Scalefree\Scale free-Sym)
Output dataset:               ActorByDistanceReach (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\ActorByDistanceReach)
Output reachcentrality measure matrix saved as dataset ReachCentrality 
(C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\ReachCentrality)
Output actor-by-distance proportion-of-nodes-reached matrix saved as dataset 
ActorByDistanceReach (C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\ActorByDistanceReach)
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  23 mai 12 02:22:34
Copyright (c) 1999-2008 Analytic Technologies
*Affiliations Reach Centrality
REACH CENTRALITY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Input dataset:                          2-mode-RowAff (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\UCINET data\formal datasets\2-mode Data\2-mode-RowAff)
Output dataset:                         ActorByDistanceReach (C:\Users\Joakim 
Ulstein\Documents\ActorByDistanceReach)
WARNING: Data matrix dichotomized such that Xij > 0 was recoded to 1
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Output reachcentrality measure matrix saved as dataset ReachCentrality 
(C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\ReachCentrality)
Output actor-by-distance proportion-of-nodes-reached matrix saved as dataset 
ActorByDistanceReach (C:\Users\Joakim Ulstein\Documents\ActorByDistanceReach)
----------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  23 mai 12 02:22:34
Copyright (c) 1999-2008 Analytic Technologies
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